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Automatic Static Analysis of Software Performance
Oswaldo Luis Olivo, Ph.D.
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Is¸il Dillig
Performance is a critical component of software quality. Software per-
formance can have drastic repercussions on an application, frustrating its users
, breaking the functionality of its components, or even rendering it defenseless
against hackers. Unfortunately, unlike in the program verification domain,
robust analysis techniques for software performance are almost non-existent.
In this thesis we formalize important classes of performance-related
bugs and security vulnerabilities, and implement novel static analysis tech-
niques for automatically detecting them in widely used open-source applica-
tions. Our tools are able to uncover 92 performance bugs and 47 security
vulnerabilities, while analyzing hundreds of thousands of lines of code and
reporting a modest amount of false positives.
Our work opens a new avenue for research: the development of rigorous
automatic analyses for effective software performance understanding, inspired
by traditional research in functional verification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Society is becoming increasingly dependent on software. We rely on
computer programs for entertainment purposes such as browsing the Web,
playing games or watching videos, as well as more critical tasks such as medical
surgery, industrial automation, and banking. Emerging technologies such as
mobile devices and the Internet-of-Things are a strong indicator that software
will continue to form an integral part of our daily lives. Thus, ensuring the
quality of software is a critical goal in modern times.
Functionality bugs are clearly important, so techniques for testing and
verification of software functionality have been studied and developed for
decades in both academia and industry. However, software quality is com-
prised of other aspects beyond functionality such as performance, security,
maintainability, usability, and these components can have an influence on each
other. In particular, problematic performance can have subtle effects on dif-
ferent dimensions of software quality. Inefficient performance can hang the
application and break its functionality, or at least frustrate its users and af-
fect its usability. Performance that is controllable by an attacker, even with
the absence of implementation inefficiencies, can constitute a denial-of-service
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vulnerability. A performance difference while servicing a request depending on
private information, say a short execution path and a long execution path, can
leak private information to a hacker. These are just a few examples of the dras-
tic consequences of problematic performance, and its different manifestations
beyond slow program execution.
There is a need for automated techniques to achieve effective perfor-
mance understanding, recognizing the different manifestations of problematic
performance and their effect on the other components of software quality. This
thesis provides the necessary groundwork to make progress towards that goal,
by defining classes of important performance-related bugs and vulnerabilities
and describing practical detection techniques.
1.1 Challenges
A key challenge in static performance analysis is defining the perfor-
mance properties to verify. While functional static analyses typically rely on
checking for undesirable values in a program’s state (null pointer dereference,
array access out of bounds, among others), it is harder to specify undesir-
able performance in a similar manner. In general it’s not apparent whether
a program’s performance can be improved, since it depends on user inputs,
the execution environment, and what constitutes unnaceptable performance
for one feature of the application might be optimal for another one. Another
complication is that problematic performance has very different manifesta-
tions: a denial-of-service vulnerability might be caused due to performance
2
controlled by an attacker, while a privacy leak might result from a perfor-
mance difference in terms of private information. In summary, problematic
software performance goes beyond the traditional notion of slow execution.
Even with the fundamental definitions of performance bugs and vulner-
abilities in place, there remains the technical challenge of implementing precise
and scalable static analyses for their detection. Given that static analyses lack
information that is only available at runtime, they tend to overapproximate the
behavior of the program, which can lead to false positives (reported warnings
that do not represent real problems). It is imperative that static analyses min-
imize the number of false positives, preserve automation as much as possible
(by not relying excessively on user annotations) and find important issues in
realistic applications. Existing techniques for performance analysis are mostly
dynamic. They rely on program testing and profiling, and require subsequent
human judgment to detect and eliminate performance problems. But find-
ing the right inputs that trigger performance issues is extremely laborious,
and these approaches rely excessively on human judgment to detect problem-
atic performance. Static approaches involving worst-case execution time have
been shown to suffer from scalability or precision issues for realistic programs,
while still relying on human judgment in similar spirit to dynamic approaches.
Additionally, there’s been substantial effort spanning the fields of algorithms,
computer architecture, and compilers to improve performance in terms of pro-
gram running time. But they cover a limited aspect of performance —the need
to make programs run faster— and are unable to assess the more subtle di-
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mensions of performance and its influence on other factors of software quality.
For example, performance bugs involve the notion of features of the program
being replaced by a more efficient implementation; denial-of-service vulnera-
bilities on whether an attacker can abuse the performance of an application
and potentially fully control the performance of the application; side channel
attacks leverage the existence of a fast path and a slow path, depending on pri-
vate data, which can leak sensitive information to an attacker. These kind of
problems go beyond the symptoms of slow performance, have effects on other
aspects of software quality including functionality and security, and cannot be
fixed by simply making local, low-level changes. Instead they might involve
code refactoring across different classes and procedures, imposing limitations
of what a feature can process, or ultimately warrant the removal of features
from the application. These scenarios lie outside of the scope of state-of-the
compiler optimizations and software evolution techniques.
The main idea underlying our techniques is to perform an approximate
asymptotic complexity analysis on the program, leveraging existing static anal-
ysis techniques such as weakest precondition computation and taint analysis.
We use these techniques to detect potential redundant computations, oppor-
tunities for an attacker to control the application’s performance and launch a
denial-of-service attack, or a performance imbalance involving secret informa-
tion that can result in privacy leaks. In particular, we rely on taint analysis to
keep track of user input data and secret application data throughout the pro-
gram and infer the effects of tainted data in the program’s performance. Our
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analyses are able to scale due to the effective use of existing lightweight static
analysis techniques in performing a limited form of asymptotic complexity
analysis.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we present novel techniques for systematically analyzing
software performance. We formalize important classes of performance-related
bugs and security vulnerabilities in a manner that is amenable to detection. We
have used our tools to automatically uncover 92 performance bugs and 47 secu-
rity vulnerabilities in open source Java packages from Google and the Apache
Foundations, among others, along with e-commerce, bidding and medical web
applications in PHP. The performance bugs have the potential to severely
affect the functionality and usability of the applications due to decreased re-
sponse times of their components, while 37 of the security vulnerabilities can
be exploited to cause denial-of-service attacks against web servers, and 10 vul-
nerabilities represented the leak of sensitive data such as purchase histories,
bidding histories and medical information about patients. Apart from the de-
tection algorithms, we have implemented exploit generation tools to facilitate
a more detailed assessment of the applications.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes asymptotic redundant collection traversals, a class
of performance bugs.
5
• Chapter 3 presents a static analysis for detecting the performance bugs
from chapter 2, and experimental results.
• Chapter 4 cover second-order denial-of-service vulnerabilities, a class of
security vulnerabilities that can be leveraged against application avail-
ability.
• Chapter 5 presents a static analysis for detecting the vulnerabilities from
chapter 4, and experimental results.
• Chapter 6 describes asymptotic resource-usage side-channel vulnerabil-
ities, a class of security vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to against
application privacy.
• Chapter 7 presents a static analysis for detecting the vulnerabilities from
chapter 6, and experimental results.
• Chapter 8 discusses related work.
• Chapter 9 concludes.
6
Chapter 2
Defining Performance Bugs1
2.1 Performance Bugs
A functionality bug occurs when a piece of software crashes or produces
an incorrect result. Fortunately, research in program analysis has produced
significant advances in the automated detection of such bugs [14, 93, 6, 27, 28].
By contrast, a performance bug arises when a program produces the correct
result but a simple functionality-preserving change can provide a substantial
performance improvement [104]. Performance bugs are significant because
they can render a program unusable; they can also be exploited by malicious
users to create denial-of-service attacks. Unfortunately, performance bugs are
more difficult to detect than functionality bugs for several reasons:
• First, it is difficult to know whether a program’s performance can be
expected to improve, since it depends on user inputs, on the many details
of the program’s execution environment, and on some notion of how a
“good” solution should perform.
1O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Static Detection of Asymptotic Performance Bugs in Collec-
tion Traversals. 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI ’15).
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• Second, while functionality bugs can be tested using assertions or various
automated testing tools [73, 157, 28], the detection of performance bugs
typically requires a human to monitor the program and make a judgment
call on its performance.
• Third, performance bugs often manifest themselves only with large in-
puts, so the small input hypothesis [127], which forms the basis of most
software testing methodologies, does not hold.
For these reasons, performance bugs remain a nebulous and evasive problem,
and most existing tools for detecting performance problems either rely on rule-
based pattern matching of syntactic program constructs or on some degree of
runtime analysis and human intervention.
This thesis presents a new static analysis—and its implementation in
a tool called Clarity—for automatically detecting an important class of
asymptotic performance bugs. We say that a code snippet has an asymp-
totic performance bug if its computational complexity is O(f(n)) but the same
functionality can be implemented by code with complexity O(g(n)) such that
g(n) is O(f(n)) but f(n) is not O(g(n)). Although the detection of arbi-
trary asymptotic performance bugs is beyond the scope of program analysis2,
we have identified a restricted but prevalent class of asymptotic performance
bugs that we call redundant traversal bugs. A redundant traversal bug arises
2Observe that identifying arbitrary asymptotic performance bugs requires knowing a
“best” algorithm for implementing a given functionality.
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1. public boolean render(Graphics2D g2, Rectangle2D
2. dataArea, int index, ...) {
3. ...
4. XYDataset dataset = getDataset(index);
5. XYItemRenderer renderer = getRenderer(index);
6. ...
7. int sCount = dataset.getSeriesCount();
8. int series;
9. for (series=sCount-1; series >= 0; series--) {
10. int first = 0;
11. int last = dataset.getItemCount(series) - 1;
12. ...
13. for (item=first; item <= last; item++) {
14. renderer.drawItem(dataset, series, item,...);
15. }
16. ...
17. }
18. ...
19. }
20. public void drawItem(XYDataSet dataset,
21. int series, int item, ...) {
22. ...
23. OHLCDataset highLowData = (OHLCDataset)dataset;
24. itemCount = highLowData.getItemCount(series);
25. double xxWidth = dataArea.getWidth();
26. for(int i=0; i< itemCount; i++) {
27. ...
28. if(last != -1) {
29. xxWidth=Math.min(xxWidth,Math.abs(pos-last));
30. }
31. }
32. }
Figure 2.1: A previously unknown performance bug in the JFreeChart appli-
cation that was identified by Clarity.
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if a program fragment repeatedly iterates over a data structure, such as an
array or list, that has not been modified between successive traversals of the
data structure. Since such computation can be memoized and re-used across
loop iterations, redundant traversal bugs typically result in at least an O(n)
performance degradation, where n is the size of the data structure. Further-
more, such performance bugs are typically easy to fix and often only require
the addition of a parameter to a method, the addition of a field to an object,
or the use of a slightly different data structure.
Motivating Example. As an example of a redundant traversal bug, con-
sider the program snippet shown in Figure 2.1. This code is taken from version
1.0.17 of the JFreeChart software and exhibits a previously unknown perfor-
mance bug uncovered by Clarity. In particular, the render method (lines
1–19) plots a series of data items in the form (x, y) and invokes the drawItem
method on line 14 to draw a single point within a given series. Here, the
method invocation on line 14 is a virtual call with many possible targets, one
of which is the drawItem method of CandlestickRenderer (lines 20–32).
The performance problem in this example arises because the drawItem
method iterates over all points within the series in order to draw a single data
point. In particular, the code traverses all data points to compute a value
called xxWidth, which corresponds to the minimum gap between adjacent
x-coordinates in the series. However, since the data set is not modified be-
tween successive calls to drawItem, the recomputation of xxWidth in each
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call to drawItem is redundant and needlessly traverses a potentially large
list of data items many times. Hence, this code fragment exhibits a serious
performance bug that can be fixed either by passing xxWidth as an argument
to drawItem or by storing it as a field. Not only does such a fix result in a
theoretical asymptotic performance improvement of O(n), but it produces an
order of magnitude performance improvement in practice.3
While it may seem surprising that such a blatant performance bug
exists in a mature software project like JFreeChart, there are several reasons
why this bug could be missed during development and testing. First, the
impact of this performance bug is proportional to the size of the data series
and requires data points to be drawn in the shape of candlesticks. Hence, test
cases that either use small data series or render objects in a different shape,
such as a square, will not reveal the performance bug. Second, the heavy-
use of object oriented abstractions obscures the performance bug, making it
difficult to spot the problem during manual code inspection. In particular,
observe that the drawItem() method is virtual, and the performance bug
only occurs in the CandlestickRenderer implementation. Similarly, the
collection that is traversed is hidden behind an interface, so to identify the
exact data structure, another virtual method call must be resolved. Finally,
there is a function call depth of three between the loop that traverses the data
structure and the access of the actual item in the data structure.
3For example, using the existing test harnesses from SourceForge, we observe speedups
of 8× to 11× when we fix this performance bug and modify the test harness to render each
data item in the shape of a candlestick.
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boolean containsAny1(HashSet<Foo> mySet,
ArrayList<Foo> myList) {
for(Foo f: mySet)
if(myList.contains(f))
return true;
return false;
}
Figure 2.2: Check if myList contains an element from mySet
2.2 Defining Redundant Traversal Bugs
Definition 1. (Traversal) We say that a code snippet S traverses a data
structure δ if it performs a computation whose average-case complexity is Ω(n),
where n denotes the number of elements in δ.
For instance, consider the contains methods provided by various data
structures in the Java Collections Framework. According to Definition 1, the
contains method of ArrayList performs a traversal of the data structure,
as its average-case complexity is O(n). On the other hand, while HashSet’s
contains method has worst-case complexity O(n), it is not considered a
traversal because its average-case complexity is O(1).
Definition 2. (Traversal Footprint) The traversal footprint of a code snip-
pet S, written TraversalFP(S), is the set of data structures traversed by S.
Definition 3. (Write Footprint) The write footprint of code S, written
WriteFP(S), is the set of data structures that S modifies.
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boolean containsAny2(HashSet<Foo> mySet,
ArrayList<Foo> myList) {
for(int i=0; i < myList.size(); i++) {
Foo elem = myList.get(i);
if(mySet.contains(elem))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Figure 2.3: Different implementation of code in Figure 2.2.
Definition 4. (Redundant Traversal Bug) A loop L exhibits a redundant
traversal bug if there exists a data structure δ such that:
1. δ ∈ TraversalFP(L) and δ 6∈WriteFP(L)
2. δ is traversed Ω(m) times in L, where m is the number of times that L
executes
In other words, a redundant traversal bug arises if a loop-invariant data
structure is traversed a linear number of times within the loop. We believe that
this definition captures the intuitive notion of redundancy, as the computation
that is performed by traversing the data structure can be done once and re-
used across all loop iterations.
Example 1. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the implementation of two methods
called containsAny1 and containsAny2 that determine if the intersection
of myList and mySet is non-empty. While containsAny1 and containsAny2
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are functionally equivalent, containsAny1 has a performance bug accord-
ing to Definition 4 while containsAny2 does not. In particular, since the
contains method of ArrayList traverses the data structure, myList is
part of the traversal footprint of the loop. By contrast, the contains method
of HashSet does not perform a traversal; so, the traversal footprint of the
loop from Figure 2.3 is empty. Thus, containsAny1 contains an asymp-
totic performance bug because its average-case complexity is O(n ·m), whereas
the average-case complexity of containsAny2 is O(n) for a list of size n and
set of size m.
The need for the second condition of Definition 4 is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 2. Consider the following code snippet, where the computeAvg
method traverses its input:
int calculate(ArrayList<ArrayList<int>> a) {
int avgSum = 0;
for(int i=0; i < a.size(); i++)
avgSum += computeAvg(a.get(i));
return avgSum;
}
Here, condition (1) of Definition 4 is satisfied because each element of a is
part of the traversal footprint but not the write footprint of the loop. However,
this code does not have a performance bug because a different element of a is
traversed in each loop iteration. Hence, condition (2) is violated.
14
Chapter 3
Detecting Performance Bugs1
3.1 Core Ideas for Detecting Redundant Traversals
This section explains the key challenges underlying the static detec-
tion of redundant traversal bugs and outlines the core ideas behind our static
analysis.
First, based on condition (1) of Definition 4, we see that a sound static
analysis for detecting redundant data structure traversals must be able to
perform the following task:
Given code snippet S, overapproximate the emptiness
of the set θ ≡ TraversalFP(S)−WriteFP(S)
Since θ is defined to be the difference of TraversalFP(S) and WriteFP(S),
a sound static analysis for detecting redundant traversal bugs must overap-
proximate the traversal footprint but underapproximate the write footprint.
Furthermore, since our analysis will track data structures in terms of program
expressions, we need over- and under-approximating preconditions of program
expressions with respect to a given program fragment. For this purpose, we
1O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Static Detection of Asymptotic Performance Bugs in Collec-
tion Traversals. 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI ’15).
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define the following notions of necessary and sufficient preconditions :
Definition 5. (Necessary precondition) A set of expressions {e1, . . . , en}
is called a necessary precondition of an expression e with respect to a code
snippet S, written pre+(e, S), if, for any constant c, the following Hoare triple
is valid:
{e1 6= c ∧ . . . ∧ en 6= c} S {e 6= c}
In other words, for e to have value c after S, it is necessary that some el-
ement in pre+(e, S) has value c before S; hence, we refer to the set {e1, . . . , en}
as a necessary precondition of e with respect to S. Now, we also define a dual
notion of sufficient preconditions :
Definition 6. (Sufficient precondition) A set of expressions E is called a
sufficient precondition of expression e with respect to code S, written pre−(e, S),
if, for all constants c and all e′ ∈ E, the following Hoare triple is valid:
{e′ = c} S {e = c}
In other words, for e to have value c after S, it is sufficient that elements
in pre−(e, S) have value c before S. Thus, sufficient conditions underapproxi-
mate the weakest precondition of an expression e with respect to code S.
Example 3. Consider the following code snippet S:
if(*) x := y else x := z;
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Here, we have pre+(x, S) = {y, z} and pre−(x, S) = ∅. In particular, for x to
be equal to a certain value c after S, it is necessary that either y or z have
value c before S. However, the sufficient precondition for x is ∅ because neither
y = c nor z = c before S guarantees that x = c after S.
Now, given a statement S and a sub-statement pi nested inside S, we
will use the notation S−[pi] to denote the code that comes before pi in S. For
instance, if S is the code:
x:=y; if(x>10) x++; y--; else x := 0
and pi is the statement y--, then S−[pi] is:
x:=y; assume(x>10); x++;
The following theorem explains why necessary and sufficient precondi-
tions are useful for checking condition (1) of Definition 4.
Theorem 1. Let S be a code snippet containing two sets of statements Π1 and
Π2 such that:
1. Each statement pii ∈ Π1 traverses a data structure referred to by program
expression ei
2. Each pi′j ∈ Π2 modifies a data structure referred to by e′j
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Then, TraversalFP(S)−WriteFP(S) = ∅ if:
(
⋃
pii∈Π1
pre+(ei, S
−[pii])−
⋃
pi′j∈Π2
pre−(e′j, S
−[pi′j]) ) = ∅ (∗)
Proof. Suppose TraversalFP(S)−WriteFP(S) 6= ∅ but (∗) holds. Then there
must be some statement pi that traverses a data structure δ that is referred to
by expression e and δ is not modified in S. Let pre+(e, S−[pi]) = {e1, . . . , en}.
By definition of necessary precondition, this implies that e1 = δ ∨ . . .∨ ek = δ
before S. Now, since condition (∗) holds, every ei is in the set pre−(e′j, S−[pi′j])
for some statement pi′j modifying data structure referred to by expression e
′
j.
By definition of sufficient precondition, this means that {ei = δ} S−[pi′j] {e′j =
δ}. But this implies that δ must also be modified, i.e., a contradiction.
Theorem 1 is useful because it provides a method for statically checking
condition (1) of Definition 4. In particular, to determine whether TraversalFP(S)−
WriteFP(S) may be empty, we compute necessary preconditions E of all pro-
gram expressions that are traversed and sufficient preconditions E ′ of all ex-
pressions that are modified. If E − E ′ is empty, then Theorem 4 implies that
all expressions that are traversed are also modified; hence, we can rule out a
potential redundant traversal bug. This is a key insight underlying our static
analysis, and we will compute necessary preconditions of data structures that
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are traversed and sufficient preconditions for expressions that are modified in
Section 3.2.
We now turn to the problem of statically checking condition (2) from
Definition 4. That is, given a loop-invariant data structure δ that is traversed
within the loop, is δ traversed at least a linear number of times? In our
analysis, we will check this linearity requirement by over-approximating the
following slightly stronger condition:
Given a loop L and a data structure δ, is δ traversed
in all iterations of L?
The above criterion is stronger than checking whether δ is traversed
Ω(m) times in the loop. However, since our static analysis is path-insensitive,
soundly answering the above question overapproximates condition (2) of Def-
inition 4 for all practical purposes.
Example 4. Consider the following code snippet, where n is a positive integer
and traverse performs list traversal:
for(i=0; i<n; i++) {if(i%2 == 0) traverse(myList);}
Here, myList is not traversed in all iterations, but it is traversed Ω(n) times.
However, a sound static analysis that treats the test i%2 == 0 as a non-
deterministic choice will conclude that myList may be traversed in all itera-
tions.
The following theorem is useful in determining whether a data structure
δ may be traversed in all loop iterations:
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Theorem 2. Let e be a program expression, and let E be a necessary precon-
dition of e with respect to code snippet S. Then, the following Hoare triple is
valid for any constant c:
{e = c ∧
∧
ei∈E
e 6= ei} S {e 6= c}
Proof. First, note that the following implication is valid:
e = c ∧ (
∧
ei∈E
e 6= ei)⇒ (
∧
ei∈E
ei 6= c)
Now, by definition of necessary precondition, we have:
{(
∧
ei∈E
ei 6= c)} S {e 6= c}
Hence, the theorem holds by precondition strengthening.
Simply put, this theorem states that the value of an expression e has
different values before and after executing S provided that e is distinct from
every ei ∈ pre+(e, S). To see the relevance of this theorem, suppose that e
is a program expression that may be traversed in the loop. Now, if the value
of e changes between any two consecutive loop iterations, then two different
data structures δ and δ′ are traversed; hence, δ is not traversed in all loop
iterations. Thus, the key question to answer is whether the value of e can
change between different loop iterations. Fortunately, we can answer this
question using Theorem 2. Specifically, let E be the necessary precondition of
e with respect to the loop body S. Based on Theorem 2, if we can prove that
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Program P := τ1 v1; . . . τn vn; S
Type τ := Int | Collection〈τ1, τ2〉
Statement S := skip | v := e | v.traverse()
| v1 := v2.get(v3) | v1.putρ(v2, v3)
| S1;S2 | if(?) then S1 else S2
| while(?) doρ S
Expression e := int | v | e1 ⊕ e2 (⊕ ∈ {+,−,×})
Figure 3.1: Language used for formal development.
e is distinct from every ei ∈ E, then we know that the same data structure is
not traversed in all loop iterations.
Example 5. Consider again the code from Example 2, where computeAvg
traverses the input array. Here, the loop traverses program expression a[i],
but the necessary precondition of a[i] with respect to the loop body is {a[i+1]}.
Thus, assuming a[i] and a[i+1] do not alias, we can determine that con-
dition (2) of Definition 4 is violated.
3.2 Static Analysis
We now use the ideas introduced in Section 3.1 to describe our static
analysis for detecting performance bugs.
3.2.1 Language
To formally describe our analysis, we use the small imperative language
shown in Figure 7.1. This language contains two types of variables, namely,
scalars of type Int and references of type Collection. We model collections as
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key-value stores that support insertion and retrieval of values associated with
a given key. Hence, a variable of type Collection〈τ1, τ2〉 models a key-value
store where keys are of type τ1 and values are of types τ2. Observe that both
keys and values may be of type Collection; hence, it is possible to nest an
arbitrary number of data structures within another one.
In the language shown in Figure 7.1, statements include skip, assign-
ments of the form v := e, and the following three collection-manipulating
operations:
• A statement v.traverse() traverses collection v, where traversal encom-
passes any operation that is consistent with Definition 1.
• A statement v1 := v2.get(v3) retrieves the value v1 of key v3 in the data
structure pointed to by variable v2.
• A statement v1.putρ(v2, v3), where ρ denotes a program point, associates
value v3 with key v2 in the data structure referenced by variable v1.
In addition, statements also include sequences S1;S2, if statements, and
while loops. Since our analysis does not interpret conditionals (i.e., is path-
insensitive), we model conditionals using non-deterministic choices indicated
as ? in Figure 7.1. Furthermore, we assume that while loops are annotated
with a program point ρ which denotes the program location right before the
first instruction in the loop body.
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Symbolic exp pi := c | v | pi1〈pi2〉
Read footprint Φ := 2pi
Write footprint Ψ := 2pi
Alias environment E := ρ× pi → (2pi, 2pi)
Figure 3.2: Summary of notation used in formalization
To simplify the formalization of our analysis, we omit function calls
from this language and assume that the only way to traverse a data structure
is by calling v.traverse(). In Section 3.3, we explain the inference of methods
that traverse data structures as well as our interprocedural analysis.
3.2.2 Computing Traversal and Write Footprints
We now describe our static analysis for over- and under-approximating
each statement’s traversal and write footprints. Our analysis is a backwards
dataflow analysis and is presented in Figure 3.3 using judgments of the form:
E,Φ,Ψ ` S : Φ′,Ψ′
This judgment means that under the aliasing relations given by environment E,
if Φ and Ψ denote the traversal and write footprints after statement S, then Φ′
and Ψ′ over- and under-approximate the traversal and write footprints before
S respectively. That is, assuming the correctness of E,Φ and Ψ, the set Φ′
over-approximates all collections that are traversed in or after S in terms of
program expressions before S. Similarly, the set Φ′ under-approximates all
collections that must be modified in terms of program expressions before S.
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As summarized in Figure 3.2, our analysis tracks traversal and write
footprints using sets of symbolic expressions pi. Symbolic expressions pi can be
constants c, variables v, or expressions of the form pi1〈pi2〉, which represents
the value associated with key pi2 in a data structure represented by expression
pi1. For example, if the traversal footprint Φ of some statement S includes
an expression v〈3〉, then the data structure stored at index 3 of the collection
referenced by variable v may be traversed by statement S.
Since variables of type Collection are references in our language, our
analysis must take possible aliasing relations into account if it is to soundly
compute traversal and write footprints. Thus, our analysis rules utilize an
aliasing environment E which maps each expression to its set of aliases. How-
ever, since our goal is to under-approximate write footprints, we need must
alias facts as well as may alias information, so the aliasing environment E has
signature ρ× pi → (2pi, 2pi), which maps each expression pi and program point
ρ to pi’s may- and must-aliases at program point ρ. In what follows, we will
assume that such an aliasing environment E has been computed by performing
may- and must-alias analyses prior to our footprint computation.
Let us now consider the analysis rules shown in Figure 3.3. In partic-
ular, rule (2) describes the analysis of assignments of the form v := e. Here,
we replace any variable v used in Φ and Ψ by expression e because e is both
a necessary and sufficient precondition for v with respect to statement S. For
instance, for a statement v1 := v2, traversal footprint Φ = {v1, y} and write
footprint Ψ = {x〈v1〉}, our analysis computes Φ′ = {v2, y} and Ψ′ = {x〈v2〉}.
24
(1)
E,Φ,Ψ ` skip : Φ,Ψ
(2)
Φ′ = Φ[e/v] Ψ′ = Ψ[e/v]
E,Φ,Ψ ` v := e : Φ′,Ψ′
(3)
Φ′ = Φ ∪ {v}
E,Φ,Ψ ` v.traverse() : Φ′,Ψ
(4)
Φ′ = Φ[v2〈v3〉/v1]
Ψ′ = Ψ[v2〈v3〉/v1]
E,Φ,Ψ ` v1 := v2.get(v3) : Φ′,Ψ′
(5)
E(ρ, v1) = (A
+
1 ,A
−
1 ) E(ρ, v2) = (A
+
2 ,A
−
2 )
Φ′ = Φ[v3/A+1 〈A+2 〉] ∪ (Φ	A−1 〈A−2 〉)
Ψ′ = Ψ[v3/A−1 〈A−2 〉] ∪ (Φ	A+1 〈A+2 〉)
E,Φ,Ψ ` v1.putρ(v2, v3) : Φ′,Ψ′ ∪ {v1}
(6)
E,Φ,Ψ ` S2 : Φ′,Ψ′
E,Φ′,Ψ′ ` S1 : Φ′′,Ψ′′
E,Φ,Ψ ` S1;S2 : Φ′′,Ψ′′
(7)
E,Φ,Ψ ` S1 : Φ1,Ψ1
E,Φ,Ψ ` S2 : Φ2,Ψ2
E,Φ,Ψ ` if(?) then S1 else S2 : Φ1 ∪ Φ2,Ψ1 ∩Ψ2
(8)
Φ′ ⊇ Φ Ψ ⊇ Ψ′
E,Φ′,Ψ′ ` S˜ : Φ′,Ψ′
E,Φ,Ψ ` while(?) do S : Φ′,Ψ′
Figure 3.3: Analysis rules for computing traversal and write footprints. The
notations A1〈A2〉 and Φ[v/A] are defined in Equations 3.1 and 3.2, and oper-
ator 	 is defined in Equation 3.3.
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Rule (3) describes the analysis of traversals of the form v.traverse. In
this case, we simply add variable v to the traversal footprint Φ; the write
footprint Ψ remains unchanged.
Rule (4) describes the analysis of retrieval (i.e., load) operations of the
form v1 := v2.get(v3). Similar to the assignment rule, we replace variable v1 in
the traversal and write footprints with the expression v2〈v3〉, which denotes the
value associated with key v3 in the collection referenced by v2. Observe that
v2〈v3〉 is both a necessary and sufficient precondition for v1 with respect to the
statement v1 := v2.get(v3): In particular, the value of v1 is equal to constant c
after this statement if and only if v2〈v3〉 = c before executing v1 := v2.get(v3).
The most involved part of the analysis is Rule (5) for analyzing insertion
(i.e., store) operations. To build intuition, let us first consider the statement
S = v1.put(v2, v3) and an expression x〈y〉 ∈ Φ. There are two cases to
consider:
• If x must alias v1 and y must alias2 v2, then the necessary precondition
for x〈y〉 is just {v3} since, for any value c, condition v3 6= c before S
guarantees x〈y〉 6= c after S.
• On the other hand, if x may alias v1 and y may alias v2 (but either
may-alias relation is not also a must-alias relation), then the necessary
precondition for x〈y〉 is the set {x〈y〉, v3}. Observe that neither condition
2Here, since y and v2 may be scalars, we overload the term “alias” to also mean equality
for scalars.
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x〈y〉 6= c nor v3 6= c before S on its own guarantees x〈y〉 6= c after S, as
the value of x〈y〉 may—but does not have to– be affected by S. However,
if we know x〈y〉 6= c ∧ v3 6= c before S, we can guarantee that x〈y〉 6= c
after S.
Now, let us also consider the analogous case where x〈y〉 ∈ Ψ. Again,
there are two cases to consider:
• If x must alias v1 and y must alias v2, then the sufficient precondition
for x〈y〉 is just {v3} since, for any value c, condition v3 = c before S
guarantees x〈y〉 = c after S.
• Otherwise, if x may alias v1 and y may alias v2, then the sufficient
precondition for x〈y〉 is the empty set, as there is no program expression
whose value before S is guaranteed to be the same as the value of x〈y〉
after S.
As this example illustrates, the computation of traversal and write foot-
prints for store operations requires aliasing information for pointers (and equal-
ity information for scalars). With this intuition in mind, we now explain Rule
(5) from Figure 3.3. As expected, we first need to look up the set of may-
and must-aliases (A+1 ,A
−
1 ) of v1 as well as those of v2 (A
+
2 ,A
−
2 ). Now, any
expression of the form x〈y〉 may be affected by the statement v1.put(v2, v3) if
x is an alias of v1 and y is an alias of v2. Given set of symbolic expressions A
and A′, we use the notation A〈A′〉 to represent:
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JA〈A′〉K = ⋃
pi∈A
⋃
pi′∈A′
pi〈pi′〉 (3.1)
Hence, in Rule (5), A+1 〈A+2 〉 yields the set of expressions that may be
affected by the update, while A−1 〈A−2 〉 represents expressions that must be
overwritten.
Now, let us focus on the computation of the traversal footprint Φ′ in the
second line of Rule (5). Here, for a set A = {pi1, . . . , pin}, we use the notation
Φ[v/A] as shorthand for:
Φ[v/{pi1, . . . , pin}] = Φ[v/pi1, . . . , v/pin] (3.2)
Hence, the set Φ[v3/A
+
1 〈A+2 〉] is the same as Φ except that every (sub-)
expression that may correspond to v1〈v2〉 has been replaced with v3. However,
since we want to over-approximate the footprint, Φ′ must also contain any
expression pi such that (i) pi ∈ Φ and (ii) no prefix of pi is in the set A−1 〈A−2 〉,
because such an expression pi is not guaranteed to be killed by the store op-
eration. To capture all expressions in Φ that are preserved by the statement
v1.put(v2, v3), we define an 	 operation on expression sets as follows:
pi ∈ (A1 	A2)⇔ pi ∈ A1 ∧ ∀pi′ ∈ A2.(pi′ 6= prefix(pi)) (3.3)
In other words, A1 	 A2 preserves exactly those expressions pi in A1
where pi is not an extension of some expression in A2. Hence, the overall effect
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is two-fold:
• Φ′ contains v3 if Φ contains some expression x〈y〉 where x and y may
alias v1 and v2 respectively
• Φ′ contains any expression pi ∈ Φ such that pi is not guaranteed to be
modified by the statement v1.put(v2, v3)
We now explain the computation of the write footprint Ψ′, which is de-
scribed in the third line of Rule (5). First, observe that Ψ′ contains v3 iff there
exists some x〈y〉 ∈ Ψ such that x and y must alias v1 and v2. Furthermore,
we kill all expressions in Ψ of the form x′〈y′〉 where x′ and y′ may alias v1 and
v2, respectively. Finally, since the statement v1.put(v2, v3) modifies collection
v1, the write footprint before this statement includes variable v1.
Example 6. Consider the following code snippet where x and y are vari-
ables of type Collection〈Int,Collection〈Int〉〉 and z, w are variables of type
Collection〈Int, Int〉:
1. y.put(0, w); Φ1 = {x〈0〉, w} Ψ1 = {y, w}
2. z := x.get(0); Φ2 = {x〈0〉} Ψ2 = {w}
3. w.put(2, 5); Φ3 = {z} Ψ3 = {w}
4. z.traverse(); Φ4 = {z} Ψ4 = ∅
The annotations Φi and Ψi show the traversal and write footprints right be-
fore statement Si under the assumption that x and y may alias (but are not
guaranteed to).
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We now consider the last two rules in Figure 3.3. When analyzing if
statements in Rule (7), we take the union of the traversal footprints Φ1 and
Φ2 obtained from the two branches. On the other hand, since we need to
underapproximate the write footprint, we take the intersection of Ψ1 and Ψ2.
rather than their union.
The final rule (8) describes the analysis of while loops3. In this rule,
we use the notation S˜ to denote the resulting statement when all traversal
statements in S are replaced by skip. In particular, to avoid reporting the
same warning for both inner and outer loops, our analysis ignores traversals in
nested loops when computing the traversal footprint associated with an outer
loop.
Now, continuing with rule (8), the traversal and write footprints Φ′ and
Ψ′ must satisfy the following properties:
• Φ′ must be a superset of Φ since any expression that is traversed after
the loop may also be traversed before the loop (observe that the loop
may execute zero times).
• Ψ′ must be a subset of Ψ since only those expressions that are modified
after the loop are guaranteed to be modified before the loop.
• Φ′ and Ψ′ must be inductive with respect to loop body S˜.
3This rule is only needed when detecting performance bugs in loops that contain at least
one nested loop.
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Example 7. Consider the following code snippet:
1. while(?) do i = i+ 1; if(?) then a = b else b = a;
2. a.traverse(); b.put(2, 5);
Right before line 2, we have the traversal and write footprints Φ2 = {a},Ψ2 =
{b}. On the other hand, the traversal and write footprints before line 1 are
Φ1 = {a, b} and Ψ1 = ∅.
3.2.3 Detecting Redundant Traversal Bugs
We now explain how the computed traversal and write footprints are
used to detect redundant traversal bugs. Figure 3.4 summarizes our perfor-
mance bug detection algorithm using the judgments from Figure 3.3. As ex-
pected, our analysis only reports warnings when analyzing loops. Specifically,
as shown on the first line of the Err rule, we first compute the traversal
and write footprints Φ,Ψ associated with the loop body. Now recall from
Section 3.1 that the loop contains a redundant traversal bug if there exists
a pi ∈ Φ such that (i) pi is traversed in all loop iterations, and (ii) pi is loop
invariant (i.e., is not modified within the loop).
To determine if condition (i) holds, we use Theorem 2 from Section 3.1
to check whether pi is distinct from every expression pi′ ∈ pre+(pi, S). More
specifically, in the All rule, NC corresponds to pre+(pi, S), and the check
A+ ∩ NC = ∅ stipulates that pi does not alias any expression in pre+(pi, S).
Hence, by Theorem 2, if the predicate traversal all(Sρ, pi) evaluates to true,
then pi may be traversed in all loop iterations.
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E, {pi}, ` S˜ : NC,
E ` (ρ, pi) : (A+,A−)
A+ ∩NC 6= ∅
E ` traverse all(Sρ, pi) (All)
E ` (ρ, pi) : (A+,A−)
A− ∩Ψ = ∅
E,Ψ ` loop inv(Sρ, pi) (Inv)
E, ∅, ∅ ` S : Φ,Ψ
pi ∈ Φ
E ` traverse all(Sρ, pi)
E,Ψ ` loop inv(Sρ, pi)
E ` while(?) doρ S  Error (Err)
Figure 3.4: Summary of performance bug detection. As before, S˜ denotes
traverse statements in S replaced by skip.
Now, we still need to check that pi is not modified within the loop. For
this purpose, we use the Inv rule, which checks if some must-alias of pi is in
the write footprint Ψ. If not (i.e., A+ ∩ Ψ = ∅), this implies that pi may be
loop invariant, so our analysis reports a potential performance bug.
Example 8. Consider the following code snippet:
while(?) do t := a.get(i); t.traverse(); i := i+ 1;
Here, the traversal footprint Φ for the loop body is {a〈i〉}, and the write foot-
print Ψ is ∅. Since the necessary precondition of a〈i〉 is Φ′ = {a〈i+ 1〉}, the
All rule fails (assuming a〈i〉 and a〈i+ 1〉 do not alias), so our analysis does
not report a performance bug.
32
Example 9. Consider the following code snippet:
1. if(?) then b := a; else skip;
2. while(?) do a.traverse(); b.put(2, 4);
Here, we have Φ = {a} and Ψ = {b}. The necessary precondition of a with
respect to the loop body is {a}, so using the All rule, we determine that a
may be traversed in all loop iterations. Furthermore, since a and b are not
guaranteed to alias, the Inv rule succeeds, so our analysis reports a redundant
traversal bug. However, if we changed line 1 to b := a, then our analysis would
not report a performance bug, since a and b are now guaranteed to alias.
3.3 Implementation
We have implemented our proposed analysis in a tool called Clarity,
which is written in Java and consists of approximately 8,000 lines of code.
Clarity is implemented in the Soot compiler framework [171] and uses the
Jimple intermediate representation. Clarity relies on Soot for CFG and
callgraph construction and issues a warning if any possible target of a vir-
tual method call contains a performance bug. We have also implemented our
own summary-based pointer analysis for computing may and must aliases by
adapting the ideas described by Dillig et al. [63].
In this section, we focus on two important aspects of the implementa-
tion: (1) the identification of data structure traversals and (2) interprocedural
analysis.
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Identifying Data Structure Traversals. Our implementation uses a com-
bination of automatic inference and a small amount of manual annotations to
identify data structure traversals. In particular, we manually annotate 28
methods that (a) are implemented by the Java collections library and (b) have
average-case complexity that is at least linear in the size of the data structure.4
For instance, as we saw in Section 3.1, the contains method of ArrayList
is annotated as a traversal, while HashSet’s contains method is not.
In addition to such manual annotations, Clarity performs automated
inference to identify code snippets that traverse data structures through iter-
ators or loops. However, our current implementation does not detect data
structure traversals in recursive functions. Hence, if a Java application im-
plements its own tree traversal algorithm, Clarity will not be able to detect
performance bugs that arise from redundant traversals of this custom tree data
structure.
To detect data structures that are traversed in loops, our static analysis
also maintains a so-called read footprint. In particular, a data structure δ
is added to the read footprint for code snippet S if S may access δ. For
instance, using the notation from Section 3.2, if a code snippet accesses an
element of array a, we simply add a to the read footprint R and compute R’s
necessary precondition during our backwards analysis. When we encounter
a loop, we then check whether an element a ∈ R is accessed multiple times
4The annotated methods represent a tiny fraction of the analyzed methods.
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using Theorem 2. This analysis is similar to the check that tests whether a
data structure is traversed multiple times (see the All rule in Figure 3.4). If a
given data structure may be accessed in multiple loop iterations, we then add
it to the traversal footprint Φ. The following example illustrates this analysis:
Example 10. Consider the following code snippet:
while(?) do t := l.get(i); sum := sum + t; i := i+ 1;
While analyzing the loop body, we add variable l to R. Then, when analyzing
the while loop, we check whether l may be accessed in all loop iterations by
testing whether the necessary precondition for l includes itself. Since it does
in this case, l is added to the traversal footprint Φ of the while loop.
Interprocedural Analysis. Since the key idea underlying our technique is
to compute traversal and write footprints, our analysis is amenable to modular
reasoning. In particular, our interprocedural analysis computes a procedure
summary for each method that tracks its read, traversal, and write footprints
as well as transfer functions that give the necessary and sufficient preconditions
for each data structure used in that method.
When we encounter a call to method m, we simply retrieve m’s sum-
mary and instantiate its read, write, and traversal footprints by applying the
appropriate formal-to-actual mapping. The instantiated callee footprints are
then added to the corresponding footprints of the caller. In addition, the sum-
mary for each procedure also contains transfer functions that describe side
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effects of the callee. These transfer functions correspond to necessary and suf-
ficient preconditions of program expressions with respect to the callee’s body.
Hence, for each expression e in the caller’s read, write, and traversal footprints,
we apply the appropriate transfer function to obtain the new footprints before
the method call.
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
Table 3.1: Experimental results: Performance Bugs Detected.
Name LoC LoC w/ Number of Analysis Reported Previously False
libraries Methods Time (sec) Bugs Unknown Bugs Positives
Charts4j 21,396 28,667 715 122 0 0 0
Janino 39,832 305,660 7,149 556 3 3 0
Apache Collections 58,186 58,186 3,759 180 19 10 4
Ode4J 83,207 83,207 4,048 128 0 0 0
Java3D 115,859 146,376 1,875 335 0 0 0
Guava (Google Core) 129,745 129,745 12,338 338 55 44 1
LWJGL (Game Library) 202,902 267,248 10,740 1,584 10 10 0
Apache Ant 205,371 265,828 10,029 1,325 2 2 0
JFreeChart 226,623 362,584 9,162 602 3 3 0
Total 1,083,121 1,647,501 59,815 5,470 92 72 5
We evaluate Clarity by applying it to nine mature and widely-used
open source code bases (see Table 5.4). We conduct our experiments on an
x86 64 Ubuntu 12.04 desktop machine with 8 GB of RAM and a dual-core 3
GHz processor. We evaluate our approach using the following metrics: (1) the
number of performance bugs detected by Clarity, (2) the number of false
positives reported, and (3) the impact of fixing these bugs.
Table 5.4 summarizes the results of our experimental evaluation, with
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the benchmarks listed in order of increasing code size. Our benchmarks range
from 21,396 to 226,623 lines of Java source code and contain between 715 and
12,338 methods (including external library calls). SinceClarity also analyzes
the external libraries called by each application, the actual number of lines of
code analyzed by the tool can be much larger (see third column of Table 5.4).
We see that even thoughClarity performs a non-trivial interprocedural static
analysis, the running time of the tool is quite reasonable, with LWJGL taking
the longest at 26.4 minutes. Note that the reported times include pointer
analysis as well as the time required to analyze library code.
Most significantly, we see that Clarity reports a total of 92 perfor-
mance bugs, with only five of these being false positives. Furthermore, among
the 92 true positives, 72 are previously unreported according to the Source-
Forge development logs. The numbers in this table include only unique per-
formance bugs; that is, performance bugs that are inherited by a sub-class are
not counted multiple times.
Finally, to evaluate Clarity’s performance impact, we repair each of
the identified performance bugs, for example, by adding additional fields to
classes, passing extra parameters to methods, or transforming data structures
(e.g., lists into sets). We then compare the execution time of the original
and repaired programs on input sizes ranging from a few thousand to a few
hundred thousand elements. In this evaluation, we observe speedups in the
range 2.5-548.2× on inputs sizes of 50,000 and speedups between 6.6-3,350×
on input sizes of 100,000. This empirical comparison between the original
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and modified programs confirms that the redundant traversals identified by
Clarity indeed correspond to asymptotic performance problems.
3.4.1 Discussion
We now explain the most commonly reported performance bugs and
share some observations about the nature of the performance bugs detected
by Clarity.
RetainAll Performance Bug. The RetainAll bug occurs in code that re-
moves all elements in a collection A that are not also present in another col-
lection B (often passed as a parameter). The inefficiency occurs when B has
a slow containment checking method that is invoked a linear number of times.
This bug can typically be fixed by converting the parameter collection B to
a set, either within the algorithm or at its call site, or by more complicated
means such as keeping an iterator on the parameter collection and advancing
it accordingly to avoid redundant checks. In addition to appearing in doubly-
nested loops, this bug can also appear in other ways, such as the pruning of
multi-maps, removal of data points from a plot, and intersection of build re-
sources while compiling a Java application. In fact, we observe some variant of
the RetainAll bug in four code bases, namely, Apache Ant, Guava, JFreeChart,
and Apache Collections.
ContainsAll Performance Bug. The ContainsAll bug is similar to Re-
tainAll and occurs in code that checks whether a collection contains all the
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elements in some other collection, which is often a method parameter. As in
the RetainAll bug, we see that the flexibility of generic types for collection
parameters can lead to severe performance degradation. We found several
instances of this performance bug in Guava and Apache Collections.
FilterPredicate Bug. This bug occurs when a containment predicate P is
attached to a collection C, and elements can only be added to C if they satisfy
P . Typically, the root cause of the performance problem is an inefficient data
structure used in the implementation of the predicate. We see several instances
of this bug in the Guava libraries.
TransformPredicate Bug. This type of performance bug is similar to the
FilterPredicate bug. It appears when an inefficient predicate is used to identify
elements that should be removed from a collection. Again, we find several
occurrences of this type of performance bug in the Guava libraries.
ExtremeVal Bug. The ExtremeVal performance bug occurs when the max-
imum or minimum value of a list of elements is computed multiple times,
even though the list does not change. An instance of this type of bug is the
JFreeChart example from Figure 2.1.
PatternMatching Bug. This bug occurs when checking a set of elements
against a set of patterns. The redundant traversals could be avoided by com-
bining the set of patterns into one pattern, simplifying it, and then checking
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the elements against this pattern. An instance of this bug arises in Apache
Ant when testing if files in a directory satisfy a regular expression describing
an include-path.
False Positives. Four of the false positives in our experiment arise from im-
precise virtual method call resolution. For example, in some cases, Clarity
believes that the target of a virtual method call may be LinkedList::contains
even though it can only be HashMap::contains. The fifth false positive
arises when Clarity believes that a data structure is traversed multiple times
in a loop that can be traversed only once. In this case, the code has a non-
trivial loop invariant that Clarity cannot reason about.
Nature of Performance Bugs. We now discuss some observations about
the nature of performance bugs uncovered by Clarity.
First, while the majority of the bugs detected by Clarity are con-
ceptually quite simple, they are not easily identifiable through either manual
code review or simple static analysis. Due to the heavy use of abstraction in
Java, the collection that is traversed is often hidden behind an interface, so
identifying data structures that are accessed requires virtual method call res-
olution. Furthermore, the loop where the performance bug arises is typically
defined in a different class or method from the code that actually traverses the
data structure. Hence, the detection of such bugs requires fairly sophisticated
interprocedural static analysis.
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Second, even though there are conceptual similarities between the per-
formance bugs identified by Clarity, different code snippets exhibiting con-
ceptually similar bugs can be syntactically very different. For example, a
performance bug that is classified in the RetainAll category appears in a
method called createConsolidatedPieDataset, which tries to create a
new dataset with keys above a certain threshold. Meanwhile, another instance
of the RetainAll bug appears in the Apache collections in a method called
retainAll and looks very different from the JFreeChart instance of the Re-
tainAll bug. Thus, despite conceptual similarities among various performance
bugs detected by Clarity, these bugs cannot be detected by performing syn-
tactic pattern matching on program constructs.
Finally, our empirical evaluation sheds light on the difficulty of detect-
ing these performance bugs during testing. First, several performance bugs
identified by Clarity arise in rarely executed program paths. For instance,
recall the performance bug from Figure 2.1, which is triggered when the user
renders items in the shape of a candlestick. Since this shape is unlikely to
be a popular choice, it is unlikely to be triggered during testing. Second, as
observed in our empirical performance comparison between the original and
repaired programs, the true cost of a performance bug may not be apparent
unless tested with large inputs. Since most test suites are designed with the
small input hypothesis in mind, they are unlikely to reveal these performance
problems.
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Feedback from developers. The Apache Software Foundation developers
have acknowledged the performance bugs in Apache Collections and Apache
Ant, and have either fixed the bugs or changed the documentation to warn
users of the performance implications for some input values. The Google
developers have decided not to fix the bugs due to software maintainability
considerations.
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Chapter 4
Defining Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities1
4.1 Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities
Web applications form the backbone of the modern Internet and pro-
vide a plethora of useful services, including banking, commerce, education,
blogging, and social networking. Since web applications do not require the
user to install any software beyond a standard web browser, they are enor-
mously popular. Unfortunately, this growing popularity has also made web
applications a desirable target for many kinds of security exploits, including
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
DoS attacks, which can render websites inaccessible and can cause sig-
nificant financial damage to website owners, come in two flavors. Network-
based DoS attacks require an attacker to flood a target server with many
requests, thereby saturating server resources and rendering the target web ser-
vice unavailable. In contrast, application-level DoS attacks take advantage of
an underlying vulnerability in the web application and either cause the server
to crash or exhaust its computational resources. These application-level DoS
1O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Detecting and Exploiting Second Order Denial-of-Service Vul-
nerabilities in Web Applications. 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’15).
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attacks are typically more dangerous and cannot be prevented using standard
network-level defense mechanisms [130, 4].
In this thesis, we address the issue of application-level DoS attacks
that cause excessive CPU usage. In particular, we identify a new type of DoS
attack, which we refer to as Second Order DoS attacks, because like recent
work on second-order XSS and SQLI vulnerabilities [54], these attacks consist
of two phases: In the first step, the attacker uses a bot to pollute the database
with junk entries. In the second step, the attacker performs some expensive
computation over the junk entries in the database, rendering the application
unavailable for a considerable amount of time.
These second-order DoS attacks are made possible by the presence of
lurking security vulnerabilities in web applications. Specifically, the first phase
of the attack is feasible because the application does not employ an appropriate
defense mechanism, such as a CAPTCHA, that prevents users from inserting
database entries through a bot. Similarly, the second part of the attack is pos-
sible because the application does not sanitize the retrieved database entries
(e.g., by bounding their size). Furthermore, such DoS attacks cannot be pre-
vented using standard network-based defense mechanisms: Since the inserted
database entries are typically small in size and temporally separated, second-
order DoS attacks use low-bandwidth and can evade detection by techniques
that monitor anomalous network traffic.
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4.2 Defining Second Order Denial-of-Service Vulnera-
bilities
In this section, we first give a precise definition of second-order DoS
vulnerabilities and then discuss some common mechanisms that programmers
employ for avoiding such security holes.
Definition 7. (Second-Order DoS Vulnerability)
Let P be a program using a database table R, and let VR be a view of R. We
say that P contains a second-order DoS vulnerability if:
1. The quantity |VR| can be controlled by a bot
2. The worst-case resource usage of P is Ω(|VR|)
As explained in this definition, there are two necessary conditions that
enable a second-order DoS attack. First, the application must allow a bot to
control the result size of some query on database table R. Second, the resource
usage of the application must be at least linear in the size of this attacker-
controlled view of R. If the application satisfies both of these conditions, then
an attacker can insert junk entries into R in a way that drives |VR| to ∞ in
the limit. Furthermore, since the worst-case resource usage of the application
is proportional to |VR|, the attacker can then craft inputs that trigger this
excessive resource usage behavior.
In practice, there are several ways to avoid second-order DoS vulnera-
bilities in web applications. The most common way to protect against second-
order DoS attacks is to perform some sort of Turing test before inserting any
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user input into the database. Hence, in this context, CAPTCHAs and other
similar mechanisms (e.g., text message verification) provide a form of saniti-
zation that prevents bots from polluting a database.
However, performing a Turing test is not the only way to defend web
applications against second-order DoS attacks. For example, another form
of sanitization is to require administrator credentials or to bound the size
of a view VR before performing computation whose resource usage behavior
depends on |VR|. For example, consider a web application that iterates over a
collection obtained using the following database query:
$res = SELECT * FROM Papers WHERE Author=$author
Here, if the application disallows the insertion of more than 10 papers
by the same author into the database, then the worst-case resource usage of the
application will be bound by a constant and will therefore not be susceptible
to a second-order DoS attack.
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Chapter 5
Detecting Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities1
5.1 Static Analysis
In this section, we describe our algorithm for statically detecting DoS
vulnerabilities. As shown schematically in Figure 5.1, our approach consists
of two consecutive static taint analyses:
• Phase I: The goal of the first phase is to identify tainted database
attributes. We say that an attribute K of some database table R is
tainted if |σϕK(R)| can be controlled by a bot, where ϕK is a condition
involving attribute K. Hence, our first static analysis determines which
user inputs can reach which attributes of a database table without being
sanitized. In this context, a sanitizer is a piece of code that prevents a
bot from arbitrarily increasing the size of σϕK(R).
• Phase II: In the second phase of our analysis, we start with tainted
database attributes inferred in Phase I and then perform taint propaga-
tion to identify query results whose sizes may be arbitrarily large. Our
1O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Detecting and Exploiting Second Order Denial-of-Service Vul-
nerabilities in Web Applications. 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’15).
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Phase I
User 
input
(DB, attr)
Phase II
(DB, 
attr)Loop
Query
result
Figure 5.1: Schematic illustration of our approach. Here, squiggly arrows
indicate flows between different resources.
Binop ⊕ ∈ {+,−,==, ! =, <,>, ...}
Expr e := c | v | e1 ⊕ e2 | e1[e2] | count(e)
Cond Φ := K = v | Φ1 AND Φ2 | Φ1 OR Φ2
Stmt S := v := e | S1;S2 | f(e1, . . . , ek)
| if (e) then S1 else S2
| foreach (v1 as v2) S
| INSERT (v1, ..., vn) INTO R
| v := SELECT (K1, ...,Kn)
FROM R WHERE Φ
Figure 5.2: Language used for describing our analysis
analysis then issues a warning if the number of executions of a loop is
controlled by such a tainted query result.
In the rest of this section, we will use the simplified language of Fig-
ure 7.1 to formally describe our static analyses. In particular, we consider a
simple PHP-like language that has built-in support for database operations,
such as INSERT and SELECT. Expressions in our simplified language include
constants (1, “xyz”, {1, 2, 3}, . . .), variables, and binary operations e1 ⊕ e2
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where ⊕ ∈ {+,−, ∗,=,≤, ...}. In addition, we allow array reads e1[e2] to
model reading from PHP superglobals, such as $ GET and $ POST. Finally, the
expression count(e) yields the size of collection e.
Continuing with the grammar of Figure 7.1, statements include as-
signments v := e, composition S1;S2, if statements, and loops of the form
foreach(v1 as v2) S where v1 is a collection (i.e., array or map), and v2 is bound
to each element v1. In what follows, we will use function calls f(e1, . . . , ek)
to model various kinds of sanitizers. To simplify our presentation, we only
consider the two most important database operations, namely INSERT and
SELECT2. Database insertion operations have the syntax
INSERT (v1, . . . , vk) INTO R
where R is the name of a database table and (v1, . . . , vk) is a tuple to be
inserted into R. Selection operations have the syntax:
SELECT (K1, . . . ,Kn) FROM R WHERE Φ
Here, each Ki is the name of an attribute of table R and Φ is a condition
used for filtering relevant tuples in R. Note that condition Φ is a boolean
combination of atomic predicates of the form K = v where K is the name of
an attribute and v is a variable.
2Our actual implementation handles most MYSQL commands, not just INSERT and
SELECT.
49
5.1.1 Phase I Analysis
As mentioned earlier, the first phase of our algorithm performs static
taint analysis to identify tainted database attributes. Here, taint sources cor-
respond to user inputs, and sinks are database insertions. Our analysis distin-
guishes between two classes of sanitizers:
• Full sanitizers: Such sanitizers protect the application against bots.
Examples of full sanitizers include Turing tests (e.g., CAPTCHAs or
SMS verification) as well as administrative credential checks. We refer to
these checks as full sanitizers because they sanitize every input received
by the application henceforth.
• Conditional sanitizers: These checks sanitize a particular variable v
for some attributeK of database table R. Specifically, if v is conditionally
sanitized for (R,K), this means that the value stored in variable v cannot
occur an unbounded number of times in attribute K of table R. The
following PHP function exemplifies such a conditional sanitizer:
cond_sanitize(v) {
$rows = SELECT * FROM Contacts where name = $v;
if(count($rows) == 0) return true;
return false;
}
This function returns true iff attribute name of table Contacts does not
already contain value v. Since this function is used to prevent insertion
of duplicate names in the Contacts table, it sanitizes v for context
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(Contacts, name). These kinds of conditional sanitizers are ubiquitous
in real code.
Since our analysis needs to differentiate between full and conditional
sanitizers, our taint analysis is somewhat non-standard. We describe our Phase
I static analysis in Figure 5.3 using judgments of the form:
b,Γ ` S : b′,Γ′,Λ
Here, b is a boolean value, referred to as a bot checker, indicating whether we
have encountered a full sanitizer in the code analyzed so far. Environment
Γ, called the conditional taint environment, maps each program variable to a
propositional formula φ and is used to reason about conditional sanitization.
Specifically, formula φ is used to represent all contexts under which a variable
is tainted and is formed according to the following grammar:
φ := true | RK | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2
Here, RK is a boolean variable representing context (R,K). Hence, if Γ(v) =
RK, this means that v is tainted under context (R,K). On the other hand,
if Γ(v) = ¬RK ∧ ¬R′K′ , then v is tainted in all contexts except (R,K) and
(R′,K′).
Going back to the judgment b,Γ ` S : b′,Γ′,Λ, we use a set Λ to
keep track of tainted database attributes (R,K). Hence, the judgment b,Γ `
S : b′,Γ′,Λ means the following: Assuming we analyze statement S in an
environment where b indicates the presence/absence of a full sanitizer and Γ
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indicates conditional taint information, the analysis of statement S produces
a new bot checker b′, a new conditional taint environment Γ′ and a set Λ of
tainted database attributes. Thus, for a program P , if our analysis produces
the judgment
false, [ ] ` P : b,Γ,Λ
then the set Λ gives us all the tainted database attributes inferred by phase I.
Let us now consider the rules from Figure 5.3 in more detail. According
to the first rule labeled Input, a call to function user input is a taint source;
hence variable v is unconditionally tainted after this statement. The next two
rules describe taint propagation for assignments v := e and cause variable v
be to become tainted under the same contexts as e.
The next two rules, labeled Stz 1 and Stz 2, describe the analysis of full
and conditional sanitizers, respectively. According to Stz 1, the analysis of
full sanitizers simply sets the bot checker to true.3 The second rule labeled Stz
2 analyzes conditional sanitizers that bound the number of occurrences of v
that can appear in attribute K of table R. Since variable v is now sanitized for
context (R,K), we only propagate taint for v when ¬RK is true. Even though
we model conditional sanitizers using the function call cond sanitizer(v,R,K),
our analysis automatically infers PHP/SQL expressions that perform such
conditional sanitization. By contrast, our analysis requires manual annotations
3The careful reader may wonder why we do not analyze full sanitizers by simply setting
Γ to be the empty map. While this strategy can be made sound, it would be imprecise
because the program may apply full sanitization before asking the user for input.
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(Input)
Γ′ = Γ[v 7→ true]
b,Γ ` v := user input() : b,Γ′, ∅
(Asn. 1)
e 6∈ dom(Γ)
b,Γ ` v := e : b,Γ, ∅
(Asn. 2)
e ∈ dom(Γ)
b,Γ ` v := e : b,Γ[v 7→ Γ(e)], ∅
(Stz. 1)
b,Γ ` full sanitizer() : true,Γ, ∅
(Stz. 2)
Γ′ = Γ[v 7→ (Γ(v) ∧ ¬RK)]
b,Γ ` cond sanitizer(v,R,K) : b,Γ′, ∅
(Insert)
Attributes(R) = (K1, . . . ,Kn)
Λ = {(R,Ki) | b = false ∧ Γ(vi) 6⇒ ¬RKi}
b,Γ ` INSERT (v1, ..., vn) INTO R : b,Γ′,Λ
(Seq)
b,Γ ` S1 : b1,Γ1,Λ1
b1,Γ1 ` S2 : b2,Γ2,Λ2
b,Γ ` S1;S2 : b2,Γ2,Λ1 ∪ Λ2
(If)
b,Γ ` S1 : b1,Γ1,Λ1
b,Γ ` S2 : b2,Γ2,Λ2
Γ′ = Γ1 unionsq Γ2
Λ′ = Λ1 ∪ Λ2
b,Γ ` if(e) then S1 else S2 : b1 ∧ b2,Γ′,Λ′
Figure 5.3: Phase I static analysis
for full sanitizers (please see Section 5.3).
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The rule labeled Insert describes the analysis of database insertions,
which correspond to taint sinks. To understand this rule, suppose that we are
performing an insertion into database table R which has attributesK1, . . . ,Kn.
Now, if we have previously performed full sanitization, we know that this
insertion is not being performed by a bot. Hence, if b is true, then |σϕK(R)| is
not controlled by a bot, and (R,K) should not become tainted. Similarly, if we
have performed conditional sanitization to restrict the number of occurrences
of value vi in the Ki’th attribute of R, then |σϕKi (R)| is bounded; hence,
(R,Ki) is not tainted. Thus, our analysis considers an insertion to be a sink
for (R,Ki) only when b is false and Γ(vi) 6⇒ ¬RKi (i.e., it is possible that vi is
tainted under context (R,Ki)).
The last two rules of Figure 5.3 summarize taint propagation for se-
quences and if statements. In the Seq rule, observe that we take the union of
Λ1 and Λ2 because a database attribute (R,K) is tainted if it is either tainted
in S1 or S2.
Finally, let us consider taint propagation for a conditional statement
of the form if(e) then S1 else S2. Here, we can only be sure that a full sani-
tization has been performed if it has been performed in both branches; thus,
our analysis takes the conjunction of b1 and b2. On the other hand, since we
want to overapproximate tainted database attributes, we propagate the union
of Λ1 and Λ2. Similarly, since we also want to be conservative about taint
information for variables, we compute the join (unionsq) of Γ1 and Γ2, defined as
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follows:
(Γ1 unionsq Γ2)(v) =

Γ1(v) if v 6∈ dom(Γ2)
Γ2(v) if v 6∈ dom(Γ1)
Γ1(v) ∨ Γ2(v) otherwise
In other words, this join operation ensures that variable v is tainted if it is
tainted in either branch.
Observe that the rules from Figure 5.3 omit the analysis of loops and
selection operations because (1) our analysis unrolls loops a fixed number of
times, and (2) selection operations are effectively no-ops for the first analysis.
5.1.2 Phase II Analysis
The second phase of our algorithm performs a different kind of static
taint analysis to infer Ω(n) computation over tainted query results (views). For
the Phase II analysis, taint sources are elements of set Λ (i.e., tainted database
attributes) inferred by the Phase I analysis. On the other hand, taint sinks are
loops that iterate over collections. Unlike the Phase I analysis where we need
to differentiate between two classes of sanitizers, the notion of sanitization
for the Phase II analysis is more straightforward: Specifically, we say that a
collection v is sanitized if its size is bounded.
The taint propagation rules for Phase II are described in Figure 5.4
using judgments of the form:
Λ,Υ ` S : Υ′,E
Here, Λ is the output of the first static analysis (i.e., tainted database at-
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tributes), and E is a boolean variable indicating whether a vulnerability has
been encountered. The set Υ is a set of variables that correspond to tainted
query results. Essentially, our phase II analysis propagates taint arising from
selection operations and issues a warning when the number of loop iterations
depends on a tainted variable v ∈ Υ.
Let us now consider the rules from Figure 5.4 in more detail. The first
rule for assignments v := e simply propagates taint to v if e is tainted. The
second rule analyzes sanitizers that perform some bounds checking on the size
of a collection v. In this case, since the size of collection of v is bounded, we
simply remove v from the set of tainted variables Υ. While Figure 5.4 models
sanitizers using a function call sanitize(v), our implementation automatically
infers sanitization expressions that perform bounds checking on the size of
collections.
The most interesting aspect of Phase II is the analysis of selection
operations. Here, given a set Λ of tainted database attributes, we need to
infer whether the result of a selection query is also tainted. Unsurprisingly,
this depends on the expression Φ used in the WHERE clause of the query.
For this purpose, our analysis utilizes the helper rules shown in Figure 7.2.
Given tainted attributes Λ and a database table R, these rules decide whether
to propagate taint or not. In particular, given a query whose WHERE clause
is Φ, the judgment Λ,R ` Φ : true indicates that taint should be propagated
to the result of the query.
The first two rules in Figure 7.2 deal with the base case where Φ is
56
an atomic predicate of the form K = v. In this case, if (R,K) is not tainted
(i.e., (R,K) 6∈ Λ), then the result of the query cannot be unbounded; hence,
Λ,R ` K = v : true if and only if (R,K) ∈ Λ. If the WHERE clause involves
AND, then the result is tainted iff both Φ1 and Φ2 are tainted. In contrast,
Φ1 OR Φ2 yields true iff Λ,R ` Φi : true for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Based on this discussion, let us go back to the Select rule from Fig-
ure 5.4. As expected, the query result v becomes tainted if and only if
Λ,R ` Φ : true; hence, we only add v to set Υ under this condition. Since the
rules Seq and If are similar to taint propagation from the first phase, we do
not describe them in detail.
In Figure 5.4, the last rule for loops describes the analysis of sinks.
In particular, since the loop iterates over collection v1, the CPU usage of the
program is Ω(count(v1)).
4 Furthermore, if v1 ∈ Υ, we know that the size of v1
may be unbounded, so the analysis issues a warning if v1 ∈ Υ. Note that this
rule also propagates taint for the loop body.
5.2 Attack Vector Generation
So far, we have described a static analysis for identifying second-order
DoS vulnerabilities. However, our static analysis has two main limitations:
First, it can have false positives. Second, even when the tool reports a true
4Unless there is a break or return statement, in which case the attacker should insert
values in the first phase that don’t trigger these statements. In our experience, we don’t
find this to be an obstacle for the attacker.
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positive, it can be hard to understand the conditions under which the detected
vulnerability can be exploited. Hence, to help programmers understand and
confirm the warnings generated by the tool, we have also developed an attack
vector generation engine. In the context of second-order DoS vulnerabilities,
an attack vector consists of the following:
• Component 1: A set S of tuples inserted into the database, together
with other user inputs that are needed to trigger these insertion opera-
tions
• Component 2: A particular database query that causes the application
to perform some expensive computation over S (again, along with other
user inputs that are necessary for triggering this behavior)
As shown schematically in Figure 5.6, our approach to automated
attack generation is based on backwards symbolic execution and constraint
solving. Specifically, given a pair of program locations pi0, pi1 associated with
sources and sinks, we perform backwards symbolic execution to collect a set of
constraints φ describing the conditions under which execution will reach from
pi0 to pi1. We then use an SMT solver to find a satisfying assignment σ to φ
and use σ to generate a candidate attack vector.
5.2.1 Backwards Symbolic Execution
Given source and sink locations pi0, pi1, the goal of our symbolic execu-
tion is to generate a constraint φ that describes the conditions under which
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control will reach from pi0 to pi1. This analysis is described in Figure 5.7 using
judgments of the following shape:
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` S : φ′, b′
Here, pi0 and pi1 are the source and sink locations respectively and b is a boolean
value indicating whether we have reached the source. Given condition φ,
formula φ′ represents the constraint under which control will reach pi1 starting
from the current statement S. Hence, if our analysis produces the judgment:
false, false, pi0, pi1 ` P : φ,
then φ yields the condition under which pi1 is reachable from pi0 in program P .
Let us now consider the rules from Figure 5.6 in more detail. According
to rule 1, if we encounter a sink statement at program point pi1, we know that
pi1 is unconditionally reachable from this statement; hence, we propagate true.
On the other hand, if we encounter a source at program point pi0, we have
reached the desired source; hence, we set the boolean variable b to true to
indicate that we should stop computing weakest preconditions.
Continuing with rule (3) for assignment v := e, we use the standard
rule for weakest precondition computation by substituting e for v in constraint
φ. However, if we have already reached the source (i.e, b is true), we do not
need to compute weakest preconditions; hence, the generated constraint is
(b → φ) ∧ (¬b → φ[e/v]). Rule (4) for composition (S1;S2) also computes
weakest preconditions in the standard way.
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Rule (5) for conditionals is a bit more involved. First, we compute
the weakest precondition of φ with respect to the then and else branches.
Now, if we have encountered the source pi0 in either branch, we need to stop
propagating the weakest precondition; hence the new value of boolean b′ is
b1 ∨ b2. Assuming we have not yet encountered the desired source, the new
precondition is computed as (e ∧ φ1) ∨ (¬e ∧ φ2). To see why this is correct,
consider two cases: If there is sink pi1 is in the then branch, then condition
e needs to be true for control to reach pi1; hence, we conjoin e with φ1. On
the other hand, if the desired sink is in the else branch, ¬e needs to hold for
control to reach pi1. Note that at least one of φ1 and φ2 is guaranteed to be
false because the sink location cannot be in both branches simultaneously.
The last rule describes the analysis of SELECT statements. This rule
is similar to the assignment rule, except that we now substitute v with a more
complex term t that involves set comprehensions. In particular, term t is a set
that contains all tuples in R satisfying condition Φ.
5.2.2 Using Constraints to Generate Inputs
We now describe how to use the constraints from Section 5.2.1 to gen-
erate attack vectors. As in Section 5.1, the attack vector generation consists
of two phases: In the first phase, the input to the analysis is a (user input,
database insertion) pair discovered to be a feasible source-sink flow in the
Phase I static analysis of Section 5.1.1. Similarly, for the second phase of
attack vector generation, the input is a (database selection, loop) pair that
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is deemed to be a feasible source-sink flow according to the Phase 2 static
analysis (Section 5.1.2).
The second phase of attack vector generation is simpler than the first
phase because we only need to compute a single input. For this purpose,
we get a satisfying assignment σ to the constraint generated using backwards
symbolic execution. The input values given by σ, together with the database
query for the sink, are now used to generate the second component of the
attack vector.
The first phase of attack vector generation is a bit more involved since
we need to generate a sequence of tuples, rather than a single input. A key
challenge here is that the constraint φ generated using symbolic execution can
refer to database R, which evolves as we insert new tuples into the database.
To address this challenge, we employ an iterative algorithm that repeatedly
instantiates constraint φ with respect to the actual tuples inserted into the
database. In particular, given a set variable R used in constraint φ, we first
initialize it to the empty set and get a satisfying assignment σ0 for φ[∅/R].
This assignment σ0 is now used to generate a concrete tuple t to insert into
the database. In the next iteration, we instantiate R with the set {t} and ask
for a new satisfying assignment σ1 to φ[{t}/R]. This process continues until
we have inserted a sufficiently large number of tuples into the database.
Example 11. We illustrate attack vector generation using a realistic code
pattern commonly found in PHP programs:
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L1: x := $_POST["a"]; y := $_POST["b"]; z := $_POST["c"];
if (z == "1") {
v := SELECT (k1, k2) from R where k2 = y;
if(count(v)==0)
L2: INSERT (x, y) INTO R;
}
Our goal is to generate a sequence of tuples that can reach the database
insertion at program point L2 starting from program location L1. Using back-
wards symbolic execution, we first generate the following constraint φ:
$ POST[“c”] = 1 ∧
count({(e.K1, e.K2) | e ∈ R ∧ e.K2 = $ POST[“b”]}) = 0
To generate the first tuple, we instantiate R with ∅, which yields $ POST["c"]
= "1". Hence, the values of $ POST["a"] and $ POST["b"] are uncon-
strained, but $ POST["c"] must be "1"; so suppose we generate the in-
put "aa", "bb", "1". In the next iteration, we instantiate R with {
("aa", "bb") } in φ. This new constraint now tells us that, in addition
to $ POST["c"] = "1", we need $ POST["b"] 6= "bb". Hence, we now
pick the next input to be "aa", "bc", "1". In the next iteration, we in-
stantiate R with the set { ("aa", "bb"), ("aa", "bc") }, which tells
us that $ POST["c"] = "1" ∧ $ POST["b"] 6= "bb" ∧ $ POST["b"] 6=
"bc". This process continues until we have inserted sufficiently many tuples
into the database.
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5.2.3 Constraint Solving
As described in the previous subsections, the formulas we need to solve
for attack vector generation belong to the following constraint language :
Term t := c | x | f(t) | {x | x ∈ S ∧ φ}
Formula φ := true | false | t1 op t2
| φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | ¬φ | φ1 → φ2
Here, c is a constant, x is a variable, f is an uninterpreted function, and
S is a set. If we exclude set comprehension terms of the form {x | x ∈ S ∧φ}
from this constraint language, then our formulas would belong to the stan-
dard first order theory of equality with uninterpreted functions (and linear
arithmetic) and could be directly solved using off-the-shelf SMT solvers. Un-
fortunately, to allow the computation of weakest preconditions in the presence
of database queries, our analysis also needs to introduce set comprehension
terms which are not supported by standard SMT solvers. For this purpose,
we employ a customized decision procedure that overapproximates satisfiabil-
ity by performing a transformation and using off-the-shelf SMT solvers. In
particular, our algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Replace each set comprehension term ti ∈ φ with a fresh variable xi and
generate the formula φ′ = φ[xi/ti] and the mapping Γ : {xi 7→ ti}
2. Let Γ(xi) be {x | x ∈ Si ∧ φi}. Now, generate the constraint:
φ′′ = (
∧
xi∈dom(Γ)
(count(xi) = 0→
∧
eij∈Si
¬φi[eij/x]))
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3. Use an off-the-shelf SMT solver to get a satisfying assignment to φ′ ∧ φ′′
It is easy to see that our procedure overapproximates satisfiability: In
particular, we construct φ′ by replacing set comprehension terms with fresh
variables. Second, observe that count(xi) = 0 implies that xi must be the
empty set; hence if xi represents a set comprehension term {x | x ∈ Si ∧ φi},
we know that φi must evaluate to false for all elements in set Si, which is
expressed using φ′′.
Since our procedure overapproximates satisfiability, it is possible that
the inputs generated using our technique do not trigger the desired source-sink
flow in reality. However, we have not observed this overapproximation to be a
problem in practice. Specifically, the overwhelming majority of the set compre-
hension terms ti appear in the form count(t) = 0; and, under this restriction,
it can be shown that φ′ ∧ φ′′ is equisatisfiable to the original constraint φ.
5.3 Implementation
Torpedo consists of approximately 4,000 lines of PHP code. We use
Nikic’s PHP parser [142] to obtain an initial AST and then construct our
own CFG representation for each function. Since an SMT solver (recall Sec-
tion 5.2) is needed to automatically generate attack vectors, Torpedo uses the
Z3 SMT solver [193] and its string solving plug-in [194] for finding satisfying
assignments to constraints. For interprocedural analysis, Torpedo concep-
tually performs function inlining by “gluing together” the CFGs of callees at
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method invocation sites.
Internally, Torpedo consists of four different modules, namely, (1)
static taint analysis, (2) symbolic execution engine, (3) sanitization inference,
and (4) an engine for inferring database schemas. Since we have already de-
scribed the taint analyzer and symbolic execution engine in detail, we now
briefly outline the design of modules (3) and (4).
Sanitizer Inference Engine. To infer sanitizers, Torpedo uses a combi-
nation of manual annotations and automated static analysis. For the Phase I
static analysis from Section 5.1.1, Torpedo requires manual annotations of
full sanitizers, since automated inference of Turing tests is beyond the scope
of static analysis. Hence, we have manually annotated CAPTCHA routines,
as well as methods that check for website administrator credentials. How-
ever, Torpedo does perform static analysis to infer conditional sanitizers
that impose a bound on the size of data structures. Specifically, Torpedo
first statically analyzes the source code to generate constraints on collection
sizes (for Phase II) and on the number of occurrences of keys in database tables
(for Phase I). Torpedo then uses an SMT solver to check if the generated
constraints imply an upper bound on the size of some data structure of inter-
est. Hence, a statement S is considered to be a sanitizer if the size of a data
structure is unbounded before S but becomes bounded after S.
Database Schema Inference. Recall from Section 5.1 that our static anal-
ysis needs to know the attributes for a given database table, so Torpedo
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performs a pre-analysis that infers the schema for each database table. Specif-
ically, after parsing all files in the application, Torpedo looks for CREATE
TABLE instructions in the source code, and it records the ordered set of at-
tributes associated with each table name. Since database queries in PHP can
be generated dynamically through the use of string variables, Torpedo can
only over-approximate the set of string values provided to the queries. As
we discuss later, this source of imprecision is one of the main causes of false
positives.
5.4 Evaluation
We evaluate Torpedo by applying it to six server-side web applica-
tions written in PHP. Specifically, our benchmarks include HotCRP (a widely-
used conference management software), WordPress (a popular blogging ap-
plication), Gallery (a photo management application), SCARF (a research
discussion forum), osCommerce (an online store management software), and
OpenConf (another conference management system). In total, we use Tor-
pedo to analyze 483,675 lines of PHP code. We perform our experiments on a
MacBook Air laptop with Mac OS X 10.9.3, a 2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor,
and 8 GB of RAM.
Table 5.4 summarizes our experimental results, showing that Torpedo
finds a total of 37 vulnerabilities across six applications and only reports 18
false positives. On average, we see that Torpedo has a 33% false detection
rate.
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Application Files LOC # TP # FP
SCARF 19 1686 11 0
OpenConf 130 22,889 7 0
HotCRP 103 48,144 8 11
Gallery 505 62,699 1 0
osCommerce 702 86,693 5 3
Wordpress 479 261,564 5 4
Total 1938 483,675 37 18
Table 5.1: DoS vulnerability detection results. “TP” indicates true positives
(i.e., real vulnerabilities), and “FP” denotes false positives.
Application n=25,000 n=50,000 n=75,000 n=100,000
SCARF 6m32s 22m53s TO TO
OpenConf 2m26s 17m49s TO TO
HotCRP 7m46s 26m33s TO TO
Gallery 1m57s 6m12s 14m8s 29m47s
osCommerce 7m16s 15m35s 33m17s TO
Wordpress 46s 2m11s 8m37s 21m53s
Table 5.2: Impact of DoS attacks for different numbers (n) of entries inserted
into the database during the first phase. TO means that the application
becomes unresponsive for more than one hour. This data only includes a
subset of the uncovered vulnerabilities.
Discussion of true positives. For the true vulnerabilities detected by our
tool, we useTorpedo’s attack vector generation capability to confirm that the
uncovered vulnerability can be exploited to launch a DoS attack. Specifically,
we devise a bot to insert a large number of junk entries into a given database
and then issue a query that triggers an Ω(n) computation over these entries.
As expected, the severity of the DoS attack is proportional to the number of
entries inserted during the first phase. Table 5.2 shows the number of database
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entries inserted during the first phase against the amount of time the server
is unresponsive during the second phase. For example, for a vulnerability in
HotCRP, when we insert 75,000 entries into the database in the first phase,
we can bring down the server for more than an hour by issuing a single query
in the second phase.
Upon manual inspection of the true vulnerabilities, we find that the
second phase of the attack does not necessarily need to be carried out by a
bot. In fact, all of the running times reported in Table 5.2 are caused by a
single database query, so automation of the second phase is not a prerequisite
for the DoS attack. By contrast, since the uncovered DoS attacks typically
involve the insertion of thousands of entries into the database, automation is
crucial to the first phase of the attack.
Another interesting aspect of the vulnerabilities is that a few tainted
database attributes typically lead to several security vulnerabilities in the same
application. In other words, many of the source-sink flows identified by Tor-
pedo’s Phase II taint analysis share the same source. For example, the 8 dif-
ferent vulnerabilities found in HotCRP involve two distinct tainted database
attributes. This observation suggests that several vulnerabilities within the
same application can be prevented by a single fix that blocks the first phase
of the attack (e.g., by employing some kind of Turing test).
Finally, we observe that the severity of the uncovered vulnerability is
proportional not only to the number of database entries inserted in the first
phase of the attack but also to the kind of sink encountered in the second
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phase. In particular, Ω(n) computations that involve network operations, file
I/O or database manipulation typically lead to more serious vulnerabilities.
For example, one of the vulnerabilities in osCommerce involves sending emails
to all registered users, which can lead to the collapse of the server’s network
for hours.
Discussion of false positives. We now discuss the root causes of the false
positives reported by Torpedo. Manual inspection of all false alarms reveals
that there are only two root causes: (1) incomplete sanitizer inference, and (2)
incomplete database query resolution. In particular, all 11 false positives in
HotCRP are due to missed detection of sanitizers, and the remaining 7 false
alarms in osCommerce and WordPress are caused by imprecise string analysis
used for database schema detection. Torpedo fails to identify some of the
sanitizers in HotCRP because the constraints generated for sanitizer inference
are overapproximate: Since Torpedo heuristically drops some interprocedu-
ral path conditions for scalability reasons, the SMT solver may decide that the
overapproximate constraint is satisfiable even though the exact constraint is
in fact unsatisfiable. We note that all false positives in HotCRP can be elimi-
nated using a few simple annotations that explicitly identify sanitizers missed
by Torpedo. Incomplete database query resolution occurs when Torpedois
unable to identify the string values of the database name and/or attributes in a
dynamic database query, and this over-approximation results in false positives.
We believe the remaining 8 false positives in osCommerce and Wordpress can
be eliminated by employing a more precise string analysis for inferring the
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tables and attributes of database queries.
Lasting Damage to Applications. While the results in Table 5.2
focus on the damage of a specific second-phase attack, the impact of the first
phase can often be much more significant: Once the database has been pol-
luted, the application is often primed for multiple possible second-phase at-
tacks, becoming virtually unusable. For example, imagine a conference sub-
mission site whose database has been populated with an enormous number
n of spurious papers. This database is unlikely to be useful for the review
process because the conference chair would have to be careful to not trigger
the high-complexity behavior in the application. Alternatively, the conference
chair could try to cleanse the database. In OpenConf, the program chair might
try to flag for withdrawal all submissions with no uploaded files. This natural
reaction to the attack unfortunately triggers the second phase of the attack.
In general, a careful attacker can perform a dictionary attack that makes it
difficult to distinguish malicious from benign entries, complicating the task of
automatically cleansing the tables without removing legitimate entries.
Feedback from developers.
Since our work, the Wordpress developers have added CAPTCHA mech-
anisms that prevent the DoS attacks against their application. The developers
of osCommerce and HotCRP have decided not to fix the vulnerabilities.
In the remainder of this section, we describe two representative vul-
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nerabilities uncovered by Torpedo and outline how an attacker can exploit
these vulnerabilities to launch a second-order DoS attack.
5.4.1 Exploit in HotCRP
One of the vulnerabilities uncovered by Torpedo is in the HotCRP
conference management application. This vulnerability arises due to an in-
teraction between three HotCRP features, namely account creation, paper
registration, and merging of accounts.
To understand the vulnerability and how it can be exploited, we first
observe that HotCRP allows a registered user to add an unrestricted number
of papers to an underlying database called Paper. Furthermore, it is possible,
although not trivial, to automatically pollute this Paper database by ensuring
that certain conditions are met (for example, $ REQUEST[“p”] is set to “new”,
$ POST[“submitfinal”] and $ POST[“submitpaper”] are both set to “1”, the
hidden formid value, which is actually leaked from the cookie, is valid, and so
on).
Second, let us consider the HotCRP functionality that allows users to
merge different accounts, shown in Figure 5.9. This merge operation first
retrieves the set S of all papers associated with one account, and then, for
each paper in S, it performs an update operation on the Paper database to
modify the corresponding author information. Thus, when merging an account
A with another account B, the amount of work that is performed is directly
proportional to the number of papers associated with A’s account.
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Thus, to launch a DoS attack on HotCRP, an attacker can implement
a bot that performs the following steps:
1. It registers a large number m of bogus user accounts.5
2. For each user account, it then registers a large number n of papers by
providing inputs that pass the paper registration filters.
3. Finally, it merges account i with account i+1 for each i ∈ [1,m−1], again
by generating inputs that pass HotCRP’s checks that (unsuccessfully)
attempt to prevent illicit account merging.
Observe that this attack causes the server to perform work whose com-
plexity is Θ(m× n), where m is the number of accounts and n is the number
of papers per account. Furthermore, since m and n can both be made arbi-
trarily large, this attack can feasibly cause HotCRP to become unavailable for
significant periods of time. For example, when m = 5 and n = 25, 000, the
bot we created was able to bring down HotCRP for more than an hour on our
local server.6
5.4.2 Exploit in osCommerce
We now describe a vulnerability uncovered by Torpedo in the osCom-
merce application. Since osCommerce provides infrastructure for online stores,
5Even though HotCRP disallows the registration of multiple accounts associated with
the same email address, the attacker can still generate arbitrarily many HotCRP accounts
because some email services, including Yahoo, do not prevent bots from creating accounts.
6For the HotCRP results in Table 5.2, we use m = 1.
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DoS attacks involving osCommerce directly cost money to businesses that use
this application. An interesting aspect of the vulnerability found in osCom-
merce is that the second phase of the attack is only indirectly triggered by
the attacker. Thus, the point of this example is to illustrate that second-order
DoS attacks can be serious even if the second phase is not under the direct
control of the attacker.
The vulnerability in osCommerce arises from an interaction between
two features, namely account creation and email subscription. Let us first
consider account creation. The key point here is that osCommerce does not
employ a mechanism that prevents bots from registering spurious user ac-
counts. As shown in the code snippet of Figure 5.9, osCommerce uses a
database relation called TABLE CUSTOMERS that stores information about
all registered users. When a user fills out an HTML form to create a new
account, the code performs checks to ensure that certain conditions are met,
for instance, that the customer’s first name and email address are a certain
minimum length, that there are no other users with the same email address,
etc. However, these checks are not sufficient to rule out the possibility that
the web form is being filled out by a bot. In fact, the application does not
even check that the user has entered a valid (i.e., existing) email address. As a
result, it is fairly straightforward to create a bot that registers many spurious
users and pollutes the TABLE CUSTOMERS database.
The next feature relevant to the attack is an email subscription fea-
ture that notifies users when certain events occur. For example, a user can
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subscribe to a product category, which notifies the user when a new product
is added to that category (e.g., electronics or groceries). Similarly, users can
subscribe to individual products so that osComerce can notify them of changes
to the inventory (e.g., when a certain product is re-stocked). Since the code
implementing this subscription feature does not protect itself against bots, it is
possible for an attacker to subscribe a huge number of spurious accounts to all
possible categories and products. Hence, each time there is a minor change in
the inventory, the application will send an enormous number of email messages
to all of the spurious users registered by the attacker.
At first sight, this exploit may seem insignificant because the amount
of work performed upon each inventory change is only linear in the number
of subscribed users. However, when we perform experiments to evaluate the
impact of this kind of attack, we find that we can bring down our own server
for over 10 minutes by registering only 40,000 users and subscribing them to
a product. If the website becomes unavailable for over 10 minutes every time
there is a minor change to the inventory, customers are unlikely to enjoy their
online shopping experience. Thus, even this innocuous-looking attack makes
websites based on osCommerce quite unusable for all practical purposes.
Moreover, we find that after polluting the database, the application’s
administrator becomes essentially helpless, as many of the application’s ad-
ministrative features become unusable due to their long setup or execution
times. The panel for displaying user profiles becomes too slow to use. Sending
a general newsletter or new product announcements can take hours or even
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collapse the network, preventing the legitimate users from receiving the mes-
sage. Personalized emails to specific users can become almost impossible to
send due to the need to navigate a vast amount of junk entries. Of course,
the administrator likely has no idea which operations have been affected by
the attack, further adding to his despair. Unfortunately, as mentioned ear-
lier, it can be extremely difficult to automatically cleanse the database in the
presence of a sophisticated first-phase attack.
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(Assign)
Υ′ =
{
Υ ∪ {v} if e ∈ Υ
Υ if e 6∈ Υ
Λ,Υ ` v := e : Υ′, false
(Sanitize)
Λ,Υ ` sanitize(v) : Υ\{v}, false
(Select)
Λ,R ` Φ : c
Υ′ =
{
Υ ∪ {v} if c = true
Υ if c = false
Λ,Υ ` v := SELECT (K1, ...,Kn) FROM R WHERE Φ : Υ′, false
(Seq)
Λ,Υ ` S1 : Υ1,E1
Λ,Υ1 ` S2 : Υ2,E2
Λ,Υ ` S1;S2 : Υ2,E1 ∨ E2
(If)
Λ,Υ ` S1 : Υ1,E1
Λ,Υ ` S2 : Υ2,E2
Λ,Υ ` if(e) then S1 else S2 : Υ1 ∪Υ2,E1 ∨ E2
(Loop)
Υ′ ⊇ Υ
Λ,Υ′ ` S : Υ′,E
Λ,Υ ` foreach(v1 as v2) S : Υ′, (v1 ∈ Υ) ∨ E
Figure 5.4: Inference rules describing the second phase of static analysis
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(Base 1)
(R,K) ∈ Λ
Λ,R ` K = v : true
(Base 2)
(R,K) 6∈ Λ
Λ,R ` K = v : false
(AND)
Λ,R ` Φ1 : c1
Λ,R ` Φ2 : c2
Λ,R ` Φ1 AND Φ2 : c1 ∧ c2
(OR)
Λ,R ` Φ1 : c1
Λ,R ` Φ2 : c2
Λ,R ` Φ1 OR Φ2 : c1 ∨ c2
Figure 5.5: Helper rules for SELECT
ConstraintsBackwards
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of attack vector generation
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(1)
pi = pi1
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` sink@pi : true, b
(2)
pi = pi0
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` source@pi : φ, true
(3)
φ′ = (b→ φ) ∧ (¬b→ φ[e/v])
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` v := e : φ′, b
(4)
φ′, b′, pi0, pi1 ` S1 : φ′′, b′′
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` S2 : φ′, b′
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` S1;S2 : φ′′, b′′
(5)
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` S1 : φ1, b1
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` S2 : φ2, b2
b′ = b1 ∨ b2
φ′ = (e ∧ φ1) ∨ (¬e ∧ φ2)
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` if(e) then S1 else S2 : (b′ → φ) ∧ (¬b′ → φ′), b′
(6)
t = {(x.K1, . . . , x.Kn) | x ∈ R ∧ Φ[x.Ki/Ki]}
φ′ = (b→ φ) ∧ (¬b→ φ[t/x])
φ, b, pi0, pi1 ` v := SELECT (K1, ...,Kn) FROM R WHERE Φ : φ′, b
Figure 5.7: Backward symbolic execution rules for generating attack vector
constraints. Statements whose preconditions are not met (or are not shown in
the figure) are assumed to be no-ops.
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...
if ($Me->is_empty())
$Me->escape();
...
if (isset($_REQUEST["merge"]) && check_post()) {
if (!$_REQUEST["email"])
...
else if (!$_REQUEST["password"])
...
else {
$MiniMe = Contact::find_by_email($_REQUEST["email"]);
if (!$MiniMe)
...
else if
(!$MiniMe->check_password($_REQUEST["password"]))
...
else if ($MiniMe->contactId == $Me->contactId) {
...
} else if (!$MiniMe->contactId || !$Me->contactId)
...
else {
...
$result = $Conf->qe("select paperId,
authorInformation
from Paper where authorInformation like ’%\t" .
sqlq_for_like($MiniMe->email) . "\t%’");
$qs = array();
while (($row = edb_row($result))) {
$row[1] = str_ireplace("\t"
. $MiniMe->email .
"\t", "\t" .
$Me->email . "\t", $row[1]);
$qs[] ="update Paper set authorInformation=’"
.sqlq($row[1]) . "’ where paperId=$row[0]";
}
...
Figure 5.8: Code snippet showing merging of user accounts functionality in
HotCRP.
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if (isset($HTTP_POST_VARS[’action’])
&& ($HTTP_POST_VARS[’action’] == ’process’)
&& isset($HTTP_POST_VARS[’formid’])
&& ($HTTP_POST_VARS[’formid’] == $sessiontoken)) {
...
if (strlen($firstname)
< ENTRY_FIRST_NAME_MIN_LENGTH) {
$error = true;
$messageStack->add(’create_account’,
ENTRY_FIRST_NAME_ERROR);
}
...
} else {
$check_email_query = tep_db_query(
"select count(*) as total from "
. TABLE_CUSTOMERS .
" where customers_email_address = ’" .
tep_db_input($email_address) . "’");
$check_email = tep_db_fetch_array
($check_email_query);
if ($check_email[’total’] > 0) {
$error = true;
$messageStack->add(’create_account’,
ENTRY_EMAIL_ADDRESS_ERROR_EXISTS);
}
}
...
if ($error == false) {
...
tep_db_perform(TABLE_CUSTOMERS, $sql_data_array);
...
Figure 5.9: Code snippet showing user registration functionality in osCom-
merce
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Chapter 6
Defining Side-Channel Vulnerabilities
6.1 Side-Channel Vulnerabilities
Web applications have become enormously popular due to the ubiq-
uity of the Internet and the existence of rich development frameworks. Hence,
in today’s Internet-rich world, most people perform their daily activities, in-
cluding banking and e-commerce, using web applications. Unfortunately, this
growing popularity of privacy-sensitive applications has also led to a surge of
illegal activities by hackers trying to steal confidential data.
To secure private data, web applications currently rely on a combina-
tion of network-level security mechanisms (e.g., encryption and firewalls) and
application-level protection techniques, such as credential checks and session
handling. While these mechanisms provide some degree of privacy assurance,
they do not prevent the application from leaking confidential data through
unintended communication channels, known as side channels.
Most side-channel leaks in web applications are related to resource us-
age (e.g., time or space). As an example, consider a health-related web appli-
cation whose response time depends on whether the user is taking a certain
medication. In this case, the server response time can reveal confidential in-
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formation about ailments of specific users. For instance, recent work [71] has
shown that timing and response-size side-channel vulnerabilities can be ex-
ploited using cross-site search attacks.
This thesis presents an effective static analysis for automatically de-
tecting resource-related side-channel vulnerabilities in web applications. Our
approach is pragmatic and aims to detect as many exploitable side channels
as possible with a low false positive rate. Towards this goal, we focus on a
subset of side-channel vulnerabilities that arise due to asymptotic differences
in resource usage. To gain some intuition about such asymptotic side-channel
vulnerabilities, consider an application whose response size is either constant
or linear (in the application’s input size), depending on the value of some se-
cret data. In this case, an attacker can easily observe a substantial difference
in response size by supplying a sufficiently large input to the application. In
addition to being easy to exploit, asymptotic side-channel vulnerabilities also
have the advantage of being amenable to detection using a fairly lightweight
static analysis. In particular, our detection algorithm uses a combination of
dataflow and taint analyses to automatically uncover serious side-channel vul-
nerabilities in widely-used PHP applications.
While the techniques we describe in this thesis can be used to detect
any resource-related asymptotic side-channel vulnerability, our implementa-
tion focuses on two kinds of resources, namely, time and response size. Specif-
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ically, we implement our static analysis in a tool called Scanner1, which can
be used to find timing and response-size side-channel vulnerabilities in PHP
applications. In addition to pinpointing vulnerable components, Scanner
further aids security analysts by identifying confidential database fields that
may be leaked due to the detected vulnerability. Furthermore, Scanner helps
users assess the severity of the uncovered vulnerability by semi-automatically
generating a Javascript exploit that performs a cross-site search attack.
We evaluate Scanner on 5 open-source PHP applications and show
that it uncovers 10 side-channel vulnerabilities and reports no false positives.
Furthermore, the vulnerabilities uncovered by Scanner are fairly serious and
can be used to obtain confidential user information, such as purchase histories,
medical records, and bids placed by the user.
6.2 Non-Interference
Since our definition of resource side-channel vulnerabilities is inspired
by non-interference, we briefly review this security policy and introduce some
standard terminology that we use throughout the next two chapters. Non-
interference [74] is a security policy that informally states that confidential
data may not “interfere with” (i.e., affect) non-confidential data. In particular,
non-interference allows a program to manipulate confidential data as long as
the observable outputs of the program do not reveal anything about the secret.
1Scanner stands for Side Channel ANalyzER
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The literature on secure information flow classifies program inputs as
being either ”high” or “low”. Specifically, high inputs represent confidential
security-sensitive data, whereas low inputs denote non-confidential public data.
Using this terminology, non-interference is typically formally defined as follows:
Definition 8. (Non-Interference) Let H, L denote high and low inputs
of a program P , and let OP (I) denote the observable output of program P
on input I. We say that P obeys the non-interference security policy if the
following condition is satisfied:
∀H1, H2, L1, L2. L1 = L2 ⇒ OP (H1, L1) = OP (H2, L2)
Intuitively, non-interference states that the program always yields the
same observable output on the same low input, regardless of the values of the
high inputs.
6.3 Defining Side-Channel Vulnerabilities
In this section, we formally state the class of side-channel vulnerabilities
studied in this thesis and justify our decision to focus on this subclass.
We first start by defining resource side-channel vulnerabilities, which
effectively arise when a program violates non-interference with respect to re-
source usage:
Definition 9. (Resource Side-Channel Vulnerabilities) Let H, L denote
high and low inputs of a program, respectively, and let RP (I) denote the re-
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source usage of program P on input I. We say that program P has a resource
side-channel vulnerability if:
∃H1, H2, L. RP (H1, L) 6= RP (H2, L)
As in traditional non-interference terminology, high variables represent
secret values, while low variables denote values that are not security-sensitive.
Hence, according to the above definition, a resource side-channel vulnerability
arises if it is possible to observe different resource usages when program P is
run on the same low input but different high inputs. Hence, an adversary can
glean information about the secret simply by observing the program’s resource
usage.
Since the above definition does not specify the specific kind of resource,
it is quite general and can be instantiated in a variety of ways to yield different
classes of side-channel vulnerabilities previously discussed in the literature.
For instance, if the resource of interest is CPU cycles, then this vulnerability
corresponds to a timing side channel. On the other hand, if we instantiate RP
with power consumption, then the vulnerability could be exploited to cause a
power monitoring attack.
The above definition also gives some intuition about a possible way to
detect resource side-channel vulnerabilities. In particular, since Definition 9
is a variant of the standard notion of non-interference, we could simply in-
strument the program with additional “ghost variables” to track resource us-
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age and then utilize an existing static analysis to track implicit information
flow [18, 17, 134].
However, since non-interference is a very strong condition that is vio-
lated by almost any program, we believe that such an approach is not practical.
For instance, consider a program that has a very minor resource imbalance
(e.g., one CPU cycle) across two different execution paths. While such a pro-
gram has a resource side-channel vulnerability according to Definition 9, it is
very unlikely to be exploitable because an attacker cannot reliably observe this
minor imbalance in resource usage.
Since our goal is to develop a practical static analysis with a low false
positive rate, we instead focus on a subclass of resource side-channel vulnera-
bilities that can be easily and reliably exploited by attackers. We refer to this
subclass as asymptotic resource side channels:
Definition 10. (Asymptotic Resource Side-Channel Vulnerabilities)
Let H denote the high inputs of a program, and let RP (I) denote the resource
usage of program P on input I. We say that program P has an asymptotic
resource side-channel vulnerability if:
∃H1, H2. RP (H1) 6= Θ(RP (H2))
In this definition, observe that the high inputs H1 and H2 are still
fixed, but the low inputs are unconstrained, so RP (H1) and RP (H2) are both
functions of the low inputs. Hence, the above definition states that it is possible
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to find a pair of secrets H1 and H2 for which the resource usage of P will be
asymptotically different with respect to the low-inputs. Since the attacker can
control the program’s low inputs, he can easily tell whether the secret is H1
or H2 by running the program on arbitrarily large values of the low input.
Observe that every asymptotic resource side-channel vulnerability also
satisfies Definition 9, but not vice versa. We illustrate the differences between
Definitions 9 and 10 using the following two examples.
Example 12. Consider the following code snippet:
foo(int n) {
if(secret) {
for(int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
consume(1);
}
}
else consume(1);
}
Let consume(x) be a statement that consumes x units of resource. If
the value of secret is true, then the resource usage of foo is n. On the
other hand, if secret is false, then the resource usage is 1. Since, n 6= Θ(1),
this program contains an asymptotic side-channel vulnerability according to
Definition 10.
Example 13. Consider the following code snippet:
bar(int n) {
if(secret) consume(2);
else consume(1);
}
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Here, function bar contains a vulnerability according to Definition 9 be-
cause the resource usage of the program differs depending on whether secret
is true or false. However, this function does not exhibit an asymptotic vulner-
ability because RP (H1) and RP (H2) only differ by a constant.
This second example illustrates why we choose to focus on the subclass
of vulnerabilities given by Definition 10 as opposed to Definition 9: Since the
difference in resource usage is minimal in Example 13, it will be hard to exploit
this imbalance in practice due to various kinds of noise in the program’s ex-
ecution environment (e.g., network traffic). Hence, our approach deliberately
targets vulnerabilities that can be amplified by the attacker through carefully
crafted inputs.
6.4 Assumptions
A key assumption in our work is that the attacker does not have direct
access to the database records of other users, and cannot steal another user’s
credentials. Thus, an attacker needs to resort to a side channel attack to
obtain sensitive information.
In order for the side channel vulnerability to be remotely exploitable,
a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability must also be present. In our
experience, requests involving search queries do not typically change the state
of the application, thus developers overlook the need for deploying anti-CSRF
mechanisms.
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We consider asymptotic resource usage whenever the resource usage
depends on string values that can be arbitrarily controlled by an attacker.
That is, the string value must not be bounded or converted to an integer
before the resource usage region of the code is reached.
In the underlying vulnerability, the attacker must have control over one of
the parameters related to a private field in a database query. Additionally,
the conditional node that depends on the secret must leak whether there is
a record or not with specific values provided to the query. These last two
conditions ensure that due to the vulnerability the attacker can use the request
as an oracle to try different values for a private field and rely on side channel
measurements to determine if the query was a hit or a miss.
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Chapter 7
Detecting Side-Channel Vulnerabilities
7.1 Detecting Side-Channel Vulnerabilities
Now that we have defined asymptotic side-channel vulnerabilities, we
turn our attention to a static analysis algorithm for detecting these vulner-
abilities. As mentioned earlier, our detection philosophy is pragmatic and
aims to minimize false positives, rather than targeting theoretical soundness
or completeness.
7.1.1 Key Ideas
To understand the key idea underlying our detection algorithm, observe
that Definition 10 requires reasoning about the time or space complexity of
programs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to statically reason about worst-case
resource usage, and existing techniques for reasoning about complexity typi-
cally do not scale to large programs [84, 83, 94, 32]. Hence, to analyze realistic
web applications with a low false positive rate, we further restrict our atten-
tion to the following subclass of asymptotic side-channel vulnerabilities that
can be detected using lightweight static analysis:
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Definition 11. (Detectable Resource Side-Channel Vulnerabilities)
Let H,L denote the high and low inputs of a program, and let RP (I) repre-
sent resource usage of program P on input I. We say that program P has a
detectable resource side-channel vulnerability if:
∃H1, H2. RP (H1) = O(1) ∧ RP (H2) 6= O(1)
In other words, we are interested in detecting a subclass of asymptotic
side-channel vulnerabilities where the resource usage is constant for some val-
ues of the secret but a function of L for other values of the secret. Our
detection algorithm targets this specific subclass of vulnerabilities because we
can find instances of Definition 11 using standard taint analysis rather than
heavy-weight resource usage analysis.
To see how we can reduce side-channel vulnerability detection to taint
analysis, consider a program that contains a conditional statement with pred-
icate C and two branches S1 and S2. In this case, the following three criteria
constitute a sufficient condition for exhibiting the behavior from Definition 11:
1. Predicate C depends on the secret
2. Resource usage in S1 is a function of low input L
3. Resource usage in S2 is not dependent on L
To see why these three conditions imply Definition 11, observe that
condition (1) entails a possible secret-dependent resource usage imbalance be-
tween the two branches. Furthermore, since resource usage in S2 does not
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Expr E := c | v | E1 ? E2 (? ∈ {+,−,×})
Cond C := E1 ◦ E2 (◦ ∈ {<,>,=})
| C1 ∧ C2 | C1 ∨ C2
Stmt S := consume(E) | source(v, label)
| v := E | S1;S2 | C ? S1 : S2
| while (C) do S
Figure 7.1: Language used for describing our analysis
depend on L according to condition (3), the resource usage must be O(1) in
executions where predicate C is true. In contrast, since resource usage in S1
depends on L according to condition (2), it is not O(1) and can be controlled
by the attacker by varying L.
The three conditions stated above also provide some intuition about
how vulnerability detection can be reduced to taint analysis. In particular,
consider two sources of taint, namely H and L denoting high and low inputs,
respectively. The first condition above can simply be restated as predicate C
being tainted by H. Now, to understand how conditions (2) and (3) can be
reduced to taint analysis, let us consider what it means for resource usage to
be a function of L in terms of the program syntax: (i) Either the resource
consumption is directly controlled by L (e.g., malloc(x) where x is tainted
by L), or (ii) the resource consumption occurs in a loop or recursive procedure
whose bound is controlled by L. We can check both of these scenarios by
tracking expressions that are tainted by L. Hence, the key idea underlying our
detection algorithm is to combine two kinds of taint analyses, one that tracks
H-tainted variables and another one that tracks L-tainted expressions.
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7.1.2 Formalization
With this intuition in mind, we are now ready to explain our static
analysis for detecting asymptotic resource side channels. To formally describe
our algorithm, we make use of the grammar presented in Figure 7.1, which
describes a simplified imperative language with assignments, conditionals, and
loops. This language has two non-standard constructs, namely , consume and
source statements. Here, consume(E) models the consumption of E units of
resource, where E is an integer expression. On the other hand, source(v, label)
denotes a taint source of kind label where label is either H (for high) or L
(for low). For instance, source(v,H) indicates that variable v is assigned to a
secret value. In practice, taint sources with label H model database queries
that retrieve security-sensitive data (e.g., password). On the other hand, taint
sources with label L represent operations that accept some input from the
user.
Our analysis is described using rules of the form
Γ ` S : Γ′,∆, χ
where χ is a boolean value indicating whether or not a vulnerability was en-
countered during the analysis of S. Environment Γ used in this judgment is
a taint environment that maps each program variable to a dataflow value η
drawn from the lattice shown below:
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Here, H indicates a secret value and L indicates a (low) input that can be
controlled by the attacker. Variables with abstract value ⊥ are not tainted,
and > indicates unknown taint.
Continuing with the judgment Γ ` S : Γ′,∆, χ, we use ∆ to denote an
abstraction of the resource usage of statement S. In particular, 0 indicates
no resource usage and 1 indicates constant (but not necessarily unit) resource
usage. In contrast, ∞ indicates that the resource usage cannot be statically
bounded (e.g., because it is controlled by the user). We define a ⊕ operation
on elements of set R = {0, 1,∞} as follows:
∀x ∈ R. x⊕∞ =∞
∀x ∈ R. x 6=∞⇒ x⊕ 1 = 1
∀x ∈ R. x = 0⇒ x⊕ 0 = 0
We also define a total order  on set R as ∞  1  0. Finally, we write
∆1  ∆2 if ∆1 =∞ and ∆1  ∆2.
To summarize, the meaning of the judgment Γ ` S : Γ′,∆, χ is the
following: “If we execute statement S in an environment that satisfies Γ, then
the resource usage of S is given by ∆ and the taint environment after S is Γ′”.
We describe our static analysis using the inference rules shown in Fig-
ures 7.2 and 7.3. First, the helper rules from Figure 7.2 allow us to determine
the taint value η for each expression E and predicate C under taint environ-
ment Γ. According to these rules, constants are not tainted (⊥), and the taint
value for each variable v is given by Γ. For composite expressions of the form
E1 ⊗ E2, the taint value is given by the join of the values of E1 and E2. For
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Γ ` c : ⊥
Γ ` v : Γ(v)
Γ ` E1 : η1
Γ ` E2 : η2
⊗ = ? or ◦
Γ ` E1 ⊗ E2 : η1 unionsq η2
Γ ` C1 : η1
Γ ` C2 : η2
op ∈ {∧,∨}
Γ ` C1 op C2 : η1 unionsq η2
Figure 7.2: Helper rules for determining taint values of expressions E and
predicates C
instance, if E1 has taint H and E2 has taint ⊥, then the taint value if E1⊗E2
is H unionsq ⊥ = H.
Let us now consider the main analysis rules presented in Figure 7.3.
Here, rule (1) describes the analysis of a taint source of the form source(v, label).
In this case, the new taint environment Γ′ is obtained from Γ by updating the
taint value of v to label.
Rule (2) describes the analysis of consume(E) statements that model
resource usage. Recall that resource usage is defined to be ∞ if expression E
can be made arbitrarily large by an attacker. Hence, we first use the helper
judgments from Figure 7.2 to determine the taint value η of E. If η = L, then
the resource usage of this statement is ∞ but constant otherwise.
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Rule (3) describes taint propagation for assignments of the form v := E.
As before, we use the helper rules from Figure 7.2 to determine the taint value
η of E and update the taint environment by assigning v to η.
Rule (4) shows how we analyze sequence statements S1;S2. Observe
that the resource usage of this statement is obtained by adding the resource
usage ∆1 of S1 and ∆2 of S2 using the ⊕ operation defined earlier. Further-
more, S1;S2 contains a vulnerability if either S1 or S2 has a vulnerability;
hence we take the disjunction of χ1 and χ2.
Rule (5) for conditionals is a bit more involved. Recall that C ? S1 : S2
exhibits a side-channel vulnerability if C depends on the secret and S1 and S2
have different resource usages. Hence, to determine if there is a vulnerability,
we first check the taint value η of C using Figure 7.2. Clearly, if η 6w H, the
statement does not exhibit a vulnerability; hence χ = false under this scenario.
On the other hand, if C is secret-dependent (i.e., η w H), then an asymptotic
side-channel vulnerability arises if the resource usage ∆i is ∞ in one branch
but constant or zero in the other branch. Hence, χ is true if ∆1  ∆2 or
∆2  ∆1, but it is false otherwise.
Continuing with rule (5), let us consider the taint values after analyzing
C ? S1 : S2 under Γ. If the taint environment after Si is given by Γi, then the
value of each variable v after C ? S1 : S2 is given by Γ1(v)unionsqΓ2(v). Hence, the
join operation Γ1 unionsq Γ2 on taint environments takes the pairwise join for each
variable.
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(1)
Γ′ = Γ[x 7→ label]
Γ ` source(v, label) : Γ′, 0, false
(2)
Γ ` E : η
∆ =
{ ∞ if η w L
1 otherwise
Γ ` consume(E) : Γ,∆, false
(3)
Γ ` E : η
Γ ` v := E : Γ[v 7→ η], 0, false
(4)
Γ ` S1 : Γ1,∆1, χ1
Γ1 ` S2 : Γ2,∆2, χ2
Γ ` S1;S2 : Γ2,∆1 ⊕∆2, χ1 ∨ χ2
(5)
Γ ` C : η
Γ ` S1 : Γ1,∆1, χ1
Γ ` S2 : Γ2,∆2, χ2
χ =
{
(∆i  ∆j) if η w H
false otherwise
Γ ` (C? S1 : S2) : Γ1 unionsq Γ2,∆1 ⊕∆2, χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ χ
(6)
Γ ` C : η
Γ ` S : Γ,∆, χ
∆′ =

∞ if ∆ =∞∨ (∆  0 ∧ η w L)
1 if ∆ = 1 ∧ η 6w L
0 otherwise
Γ ` while(C) do S : Γ,∆′, χ ∨ (η w H ∧∆′ =∞)
Figure 7.3: Analysis rules for asymptotic side-channel vulnerability detection.
Finally, let us consider the resource usage of the statement C ? S1 : S2,
where the resource usage of each Si is given by ∆i. Since S1 and S2 cannot
execute at the same time, the resource usage of C ? S1 : S2 is max(∆1,∆2),
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which is in fact the same as ∆1 ⊕∆2.
The final rule in Figure 7.3 describes the analysis of loops. First, the
assumption Γ ` S : Γ,∆, χ at the second line of Rule (6) states that the taint
environment Γ is a fixed-point, hence, the taint environment after the loop is
also Γ. Now, let us consider the resource usage of the loop while(C) do S.
Clearly, if the resource usage of the body S is ∞ (resp. 0), then the resource
usage of the loop is also ∞ (resp. 0). However, if the resource usage of S
is constant (i.e., ∆ = 1), then the resource usage of the loop depends on the
taint value η of predicate C. In particular, if η w L, then the number of loop
executions can be controlled by the attacker, causing the resource usage to be
statically unbounded. Hence, if ∆ = 1, the resource usage ∆′ of the loop is∞
if η w L but ∆′ = 1 otherwise.
The last thing to consider is whether the loop contains a vulnerability.
First, observe that the loop may have a vulnerability if the loop continuation
condition C is secret-dependent. In particular, if C depends on a secret, the
attacker might be able to learn the secret by observing the number of times that
the loop executes, which in turn can potentially be inferred from the program’s
resource usage. To understand whether the loop introduces a vulnerability,
observe that while(C) do S can be rewritten as C? (S; while(C) do S) : skip.
Clearly, the resource usage of the else branch is 0, and since ∆′  ∆, the
resource usage of the then branch is precisely ∆ ⊕ ∆′ = ∆′. Thus, the loop
introduces a vulnerability if η w H and ∆′ =∞.
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7.2 Implementation
The previous sections have explained the core technical insights under-
lying our side-channel vulnerability detection approach. However, to imple-
ment a tool, several practical issues need to be addressed. For instance, in
the previous section, we assumed that taint sources were explicitly annotated
using source statements, even though PHP applications typically retrieve se-
cret data from a database. As another example, Section 7.1 models resource
consumption using explicit consume statements, but a practical tool must di-
rectly reason about specific kinds of resource usage. In this section, we address
these practical concerns by describing the design and implementation of the
Scanner tool in more detail.
7.2.1 Scanner Basics
Scanner analyzes PHP applications and detects two specific kinds
of side-channel vulnerabilities, namely, timing and response-size side-channel
vulnerabilities. Specifically, these side channels allow an attacker to infer confi-
dential data by measuring server response times or response sizes, respectively.
Both kinds of vulnerabilities can be easily exploited in web applications by
launching a cross-site search attack [71].
Internally, the Scanner tool consists of three different modules that
perform complementary tasks:
• The detection module performs a static analysis that flags potential tim-
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ing and response-size side-channel vulnerabilities. In essence, this mod-
ule implements an instantiation of the algorithm described in Section 7.1
for two specific resources.
• The error diagnostic module performs additional static analysis to report
descriptive warnings to the user. In particular, this module identifies the
database fields that may be leaked by the detected vulnerabilities.
• The exploit generation module performs backwards symbolic execution
to semi-automatically generate a Javascript exploit that can be used in
a cross-site search attack.
The following three subsections describe each of these modules in greater
depth.
7.2.2 Detection Module
Scanner’s detection module implements the static analysis algorithm
described in Section 7.1. Our implementation considers two kinds of taint
sources, namely, user inputs and database operations. User inputs are taint
sources with label L and correspond to reads from pre-defined PHP arrays,
such as GET, POST, and SESSION. For instance, the PHP code fragment
$v = $_GET(’amount’)
corresponds to a source statement source(v,L) in our formalization from Sec-
tion 7.1.
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In our implementation, taint sources with labelH correspond to database
queries that retrieve confidential attributes from a database. Since our tool
does not know a priori the database columns that store confidential informa-
tion, we require the user to annotate database fields that are considered to
be secret. Armed with such annotations, Scanner then infers whether or
not a given SELECT statement is a taint source. As an example, consider the
following database query:
$result = mysql_query("SELECT firstname,
lastname, address, age FROM friends
WHERE firstname=$fs AND lastname=$ls");
Here, we consider variable result to be tainted if any attribute firstname,
lastname, address, or age in table friends is annotated to be confiden-
tial. Furthermore, since previous work [71] has shown that the most effective
way to exploit side-channel vulnerabilities is through cross-site search attacks
in which the adversary can control the database query, we additionally require
that the WHERE clause be tainted by the user. Hence, going back to our ex-
ample, another necessary condition for considering result to be tainted is if
either $fs or $ls depends on user input.
In our implementation, consume statements from our formalization are
instantiated in different ways depending on the type of side-channel vulner-
ability. For timing vulnerabilities, we consider every instruction to consume
one unit of resource; hence, resource usage only becomes ∞ if a loop bound is
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tainted by user input 1. For response-size vulnerabilities, resource consump-
tion corresponds to print statements. For instance, the resource usage of a
statement echo $foo is∞ if foo is tainted by user input, but has unit cost
otherwise.
7.2.3 Error Diagnostic Module
The static analysis described so far allows Scanner to detect the ex-
istence of a possible side-channel vulnerability. To help the user understand
the severity and implications of a possible vulnerability, Scanner performs
an additional static analysis that identifies for the user the information that
may be leaked.
Specifically, the error diagnostic module outputs, for each database
table, the set of confidential attributes that may be leaked by the application.
For instance, if the error diagnostic module outputs {Age, Address} for
a database table called Employees, then the attacker can infer something
about the age and address for each employee stored in this table.
To provide such diagnostic information, Scanner performs a back-
wards static analysis that utilizes the information produced by the vulnera-
bility detection module. Specifically, the input to the error diagnostic module
is the predicate of a conditional branch along which there is a resource usage
imbalance. Given such a predicate C, Scanner then collects all secret-tainted
1Recall from Section 7.1 that∞ indicates that the resource usage can be made arbitrarily
large by the attacker.
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variables used in C and performs backwards symbolic execution to trace each
variable v to the database query that caused v to become tainted. Confidential
database attributes that are mentioned in the WHERE clause of the query are
then reported as being potentially leaked.
7.2.4 Exploit Generation Module
To further help programmers understand and assess the detected vul-
nerability, Scanner also generates a Javascript program that can be used to
launch a cross-site search attack to exploit the vulnerability. We first provide
some relevant background on cross-site search attacks, and we then explain
how Scanner semi-automatically generates attack scripts.
Cross-site attacks. Recent work has shown that cross-site search attacks
can effectively exploit side-channel vulnerabilities in web applications [71]. In
this scenario, the attacker first tricks an unsuspecting user into executing a
malicious script, for instance, by visiting the attacker’s website or clicking on
a link in a phishing email message. Now, the malicious script automatically
submits a cross-site request with the user’s legitimate credentials. Since web
browsers allow a script to implement handlers for events triggered by cross-
site requests, the malicious script can perform timing measurements between
events and send this information back to the attacker2. Hence, if the underly-
2Observe that response-size side-channels can also be exploited using timing measure-
ments since response parsing times are dependent on the response size.
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ing website contains a side-channel vulnerability, then the attacker can glean
confidential information about the victim by inflating certain parameters used
in a database query.
The goal of Scanner’s exploit generation module is to synthesize
Javascript programs that trigger the vulnerable component of the web ap-
plication. This exploit generation module is only semi-automatic: Scanner
automatically infers the URL parameters needed to trigger the vulnerable
functionality, but the user must still inflate various search strings to amplify
resource usage. In our experience, the exploit generation module is extremely
helpful in assessing the severity of the detected vulnerability.
Backwards symbolic execution. To generate a script that exploits the
detected vulnerability, Scanner performs backwards symbolic execution and
automatically infers the URL parameters that are necessary for exercising the
vulnerable component. To illustrate this process, consider the following code
snippet:
1. $page = $_GET["page"];
2. $product_name = $_GET["product_name"];
3. if ($page != "1") {
4. exit();
5. }
6. if (strlen($product_name) < 3 ) {
7. exit();
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8. }
9 ...
10. if(count($x)) {
11. // do something very expensive!
12. }
Here, assume that the value of variable $x is secret-dependent; hence,
lines 10-12 suffer from a timing side-channel vulnerability. However, observe
that the vulnerable component (i.e., lines 10-12) is only reachable under certain
values of the URL parameters. In particular, the URL parameter page must
be 1, and product name must be at least three characters long.
To automatically infer these parameters, Scanner starts from the vul-
nerable component C and performs backwards symbolic execution to collect all
path constraints that are necessary for the execution to reach C. The output
of the symbolic execution engine is an SMT formula φ that encodes all possible
ways that execution can reach C. Given such a constraint φ, Scanner uses
an SMT solver (in our case, Z3 [193, 194]) to find a satisfying assignment σ of
φ. This assignment σ corresponds to concrete values of the URL parameters
that are sufficient to trigger the vulnerable functionality.
Going back to our code example, Scanner collects the following path
constraint, which must hold for execution to reach the vulnerable code starting
at line 10:
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Application Lines Files Timing Side- Response Side- False Analysis
of Code Channel Vulnerabilities Channel Vulnerabilities Positives Time (min:sec)
OpenClinic 30,849 180 0 2 0 1:09
WeBid 48,753 336 1 1 0 4:01
osCommerce 86,663 702 0 0 0 10:13
OpenCart 156,322 1,014 1 0 0 27:48
ZeusCart 166,400 612 5 0 0 31:06
Total 488,987 5,844 7 3 0 74:17
Table 7.1: Side-channel vulnerability detection results.
¬length($ GET [”product name”]) < 3
∧¬$ GET [”page”] 6= ”1”
For this constraint, an SMT solver that reasons about string opera-
tions [194] can yield a satisfying assignment, such as product name = ”aaaaa”
and page = ”1”. The synthesized Javascript program hard-codes these URL
parameters, which can be further tweaked by the user to inflate resource usage.
7.3 Evaluation
To evaluate Scanner, we apply it to five widely used open-source
PHP applications, namely, OpenClinic, WeBid, OpenCart, osCommerce and
ZeusCart. We choose these applications because they contain security-sensitive
information, such as medical records, account balances, and purchase histories.
Furthermore, these are mature applications that have been developed with
security in mind, so these applications constitute a good test-bed for evaluating
our approach.
We run our experiments on a server laptop with Ubuntu 14.04, a dual-
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core 2 GHz processor, 8 GB of RAM, and the Apache 2.4.18 web server,
connected to a campus wireless network. The client is a desktop machine
running Ubuntu 14.04, with a dual-core 3 GHz processor, 8 GB of RAM, and
the Firefox browser (version 44.0).
Table 7.1 gives statistics about the analyzed programs and summarizes
the results of our evaluation. We see that the analyzed programs are quite
large, ranging between 30K and 166K lines of code. We also see that Scan-
ner’s running time is quite reasonable, with the largest application taking 31
minutes to analyze. Most importantly, we see that Scanner uncovers a total
of 10 vulnerabilities. Among these, seven are timing side-channel vulnerabili-
ties, and the rest are response-size side channels.
Table 7.2 provides a more detailed overview of the vulnerabilities un-
covered by Scanner. The second column summarizes the information that
can be learned by the attacker by performing timing measurements.3 We see
that four of the 5 applications leak various kinds of confidential data, ranging
from medical data to bidding histories to purchase data.
The columns labeled “Positive Query” and “Negative Query” in Ta-
ble 7.2 report response times when the answer to the query is positive and
negative, respectively. For instance, one of the vulnerabilities in OpenCart
allows the attacker to infer whether a customer X has bought downloadable
product Y because the average response time is 265 ms if X has bought Y
3Recall that response-size vulnerabilities can also be exploited by performing timing
measurements.
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Application Information Inferred by Attacker Positive Query Negative Query
Avg Time Std Dev Avg Time Std Dev
OpenClinic Does patient X have a medical record? 1523.71 64.85 2020.32 137.60
OpenClinic Has patient X been prescribed medication Y? 1655.69 29.84 2358.24 119.24
WeBid Does user X have product Y on their watchlist? 96.27 10.23 513.35 22.67
WeBid Is user X bidding on product Y? 2593.63 113.80 1225.34 18.47
OpenCart Has user X bought downloadable product Y? 265.13 16.21 29.27 4.44
ZeusCart Has user X bought downloadable product Y? 329.26 14.68 32.61 8.85
ZeusCart Does user X have an order with amount Y? 4241.29 821.32 630.82 80.96
ZeusCart Has user X bought something between dates X and Y? 4580.50 121.90 668.72 62.65
ZeusCart Does user X’s order Y have processing status Z ? 4616.64 130.10 676.79 99.84
ZeusCart Is Y the account status for user X? 3740.37 468.63 798.55 64.92
Table 7.2: Summary of timing results for positive and negative queries. Times
are in milliseconds.
but 29 ms otherwise. Since response times vary significantly for each pair
of positive and negative queries, we see that the vulnerabilities uncovered by
Scanner can be exploited by attackers. The average and standard deviation
metrics correspond to the collection of 100 samples, with URL request sizes of
at most 90K characters.
In the next subsections, we describe two representative vulnerabilities
that were automatically detected by Scanner.
7.3.1 Response-size Side-Channel Vulnerability in OpenClinic
Our first example is a response-size side-channel vulnerability found in
OpenClinic, which is an open-source medical records system. This vulnera-
bility can be exploited to infer whether a patient has a medical record in the
system.
The root cause of the vulnerability is that the response size of the ap-
plication is asymptotically dependent on the search query provided by the
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attacker. When there is no record associated with the search string, the appli-
cation returns a “Result not found” page, which also includes the entire search
string associated with the query. On the other hand, if there is a record that
matches the query, the response size of the application is constant and does
not depend on the search string.
To explain this vulnerability in more detail, Figure 7.4 shows the rele-
vant part of the vulnerable code, which searches for medical records matching a
given query string. Specifically, lines 7-13 process the search string provided by
the user, and lines 14-16 perform a database query involving this search string.
The important point is that the user can set a URL parameter called logical
(line 9), and if this parameter is set to “OR”, then the database query will
return all rows for which the patient name matches any of the keywords in the
search string. If the table does not contain patients matching the query (lines
17-23), then the application prints No results found for X, where X is
the search string provided by the user. On the other hand, if there is a single
record matching the query, then the application displays the patient’s record.
(We omit the case where there are multiple matching entries.)
To see how an attacker can exploit this vulnerability, we show in Fig-
ure 7.5 part of the Javascript exploit. Here, the exploit inflates the query
string by appending a long suffix (e.g., ”aaaaaaaa...”) after the patient of in-
terest (in this case, Hoare). Note that the URL parameter logical is set
to “OR”, so the database query will succeed if there is a patient with name
Hoare. Since the query string has been intentionally inflated by the attacker,
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the attacker can tell that a negative answer to the query will be associated
with a much longer response time. Thus, it is possible to infer the existence
(or lack thereof) of a patient named Hoare by performing a cross-site search
attack.
7.3.2 Timing Side-Channel Vulnerability in ZeusCart
Our second example is a timing side-channel vulnerability that Scan-
ner finds in ZeusCart, an open-source e-commerce system. In addition to the
main store functionality, ZeusCart provides an administrator module that can
be used by the store owner to query information about customers and their
orders.
At a high level, ZeusCart contains a timing side-channel vulnerability
in code that allows an administrator to determine the order status (processing,
delivered, etc.) for a specific order and customer. Specifically, this component
allows a request to search for a customer, order ID, and its order status. If
there is no matching purchase, the administrator quickly gets an empty results
table. Otherwise, the application performs a few more database queries as well
as computations that depend on user input. Hence, the attacker can observe
a significant difference in response times when a specific user and order have
a specific order status. By leaving the order status field blank, a similar
underlying vulnerability can be used to initially infer a valid order ID for a
user.
Figure 7.6 shows the relevant ZeusCart code implementing the or-
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1. $tab = "medical";
2. $nav = ‘‘search’’;
3. require_once(‘‘../auth/login_check.php’’);
4. loginCheck(OPEN_PROFILE_DOCTOR);
5. require_once(‘‘../model/Query/Page/Patient.php’’);
6. require_once(‘‘../lib/Search.php’’);
7. $currentPage = Check::postGetSessionInt(’page’, 1);
8. $searchType = Check::postGetSessionInt(’search_type’);
9. $logical = Check::postGetSessionString(’logical’);
10. $limit = Check::postGetSessionInt(’limit’);
11. $searchText = stripslashes(Check::postGetSessionString(’search_text’));
12. $searchText = preg_replace(‘‘/[[:space:]]+/i’’, ‘‘ ‘‘, $searchText);
13. $arraySearch = Search::explodeQuoted($searchText);
14. $patQ = new Query_Page_Patient();
15. $patQ->setItemsPerPage(OPEN_ITEMS_PER_PAGE);
16. $patQ->search($searchType, $arraySearch, $currentPage, $logical, $limit);
17. if ($patQ->getRowCount() == 0)
18. {
19. $patQ->close();
20. FlashMsg::add(sprintf(_(‘‘No results found for ’%s’.’’), $searchText));
21. header("Location: ../medical/patient_search_form.php");
22. exit();
23. }
24. if ($patQ->getRowCount() == 1)
25. {
26. $pat = $patQ->fetch();
27. $patQ->freeResult();
28. $patQ->close();
29. header("Location: ../medical/patient_view.php?id_patient="
30. . $pat->getIdPatient());
31. exit();
32. }
33. ...
Figure 7.4: Response-size vulnerability in OpenClinic.
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<html>
...
<body> <script>
var video = document.createElement(’video’);
...
video.onloadstart = function() {
console.log("Started load at: " + performance.now());
};
video.onerror = function() {
console.log("Finished processing: " + performance.now());
};
var page = "1";
var search_type="1";
var logical = "OR";
var searchText = "Hoare aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...";
video.src = "http://.../openclinic/medical/patient_search.php?"
+ "page=" + page + "&" + "search_type=" + search_type + "&"
+ "logical=" + logical + "&" + "search_text=" + searchText;
</script> </body>
</html>
Figure 7.5: Simplified Javascript exploit for OpenClinic’s response size side-
channel vulnerability
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1. if($name!=’’)
2. {
3. $condition []= ‘‘ b.user_display_name like ’%’’.$name."%’";
4. }
5. if($orderid!=’’)
6 {
7. $condition[]= " a.orders_id=’".$orderid."’";
8. }
...
9. if($orderstatus!=’’)
10. {
11. $condition []= " a.orders_status=’".$orderstatus.’";
12. }
...
13. if(count($condition)>0)
14. $sql.= ’ where ’. implode(’ and ’, $condition) .
’ order by a.date_purchased desc’ ;
...
15. else
16. {
17. $sql.=’ order by a.date_purchased desc’;
18. }
...
19. $obj=new Bin_Query();
20. if($obj->executeQuery($sql))
21. {
...
22. if (empty($condition))
23. $sql1 =$sql." LIMIT ".$start.’’,’’.$end;
24. else
25. $sql1 =$sql;
26. $query=new Bin_Query();
27. $obj1=new Bin_Query();
28. $obj1->executeQuery($sql1);
29. $sql3="select orders_status_id,orders_status_name from orders_status_table";
30. $obj3=new Bin_Query();
31. $obj3->executeQuery($sql3);
32. $query->executeQuery($sql);
33. }
Figure 7.6: Timing side-channel vulnerability in ZeusCart.
113
der status lookup functionality. The webpage allows the user to supply the
name, orderid and orderstartus parameters, which correspond to the
username, order ID, and the status of the order, respectively. The code cre-
ates a query over the supplied values and calls the executeQuery method
to look for a match (line 20). If a result is found, the code performs three
more database queries (calls to executeQuery at lines 28, 31, 32). The
executeQuery method, omitted for brevity, is defined in the application
and sanitizes the input string before calling the pre-defined mysql_query
method to execute the query. Thus, the computation time of executeQuery
is linear in the size of the query string.
Since the query string is controlled by the user, the attacker can ar-
bitrarily inflate one of the query parameters to amplify the running time of
executeQuery. For instance, Figure 7.7 shows an exploit in which the at-
tacker inflates the user name parameter with spaces. Hence, in cases where
there is a matching purchase, the attacker can observe a significant increase in
running time of the application. Specifically, as shown in Table 7.2, positive
queries take 3740ms on average, while negative queries take 799ms.
7.3.3 Feedback from Developers
The OpenClinic developers have acknowledged our reported vulnera-
bilities, and are working towards fixing them. We are collaborating with the
developers of WeBid, OpenCart and ZeusCart to fix the remaining vulnerabil-
ities.
114
<html>
...
<body> <script>
var video = document.createElement(’video’);
...
video.onloadstart = function() {
console.log("Started load at: " + performance.now());
};
video.onerror = function() {
console.log("Finished processing: " + performance.now());
};
var dispname = "Hoare ...";
var orderid="3";
var selorderstatus = "3";
video.src = "http://.../zeuscart/admin/?do=disporders&" + "dispname=" + dispname
+ "&" + "orderid=" + orderid + "&" + "selorderstatus="
+ selorderstatus;
</script> </body>
</html>
Figure 7.7: Simplified Javascript exploit for ZeusCart’s timing side-channel
vulnerability
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Chapter 8
Related Work1 2
8.1 Performance Bugs
Automated Performance Bug Detection. Several recent projects use
program analysis to automatically detect performance bugs. Some of these
detect wasteful use of temporary objects [66, 159, 185, 183], others focus on
inefficient or incorrect usage of collection data structures [158, 184, 187], and
some use dynamic profiling to identify expensive computation that can be
memoized [138].
The Toddler tool [139] uses dynamic instrumentation to identify “likely
redundant” computation by monitoring repetitive and partially-similar mem-
ory access patterns. Like Toddler, our work builds on the observation that
repetitive traversal of collections likely constitutes a performance bug. Un-
like Toddler, our method is purely static, so it incurs no run-time overhead
and does not require that the programmer provide representative performance
1O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Static Detection of Asymptotic Performance Bugs in Collec-
tion Traversals. 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI ’15).
2O. Olivo, I. Dillig, C. Lin. Detecting and Exploiting Second Order Denial-of-Service Vul-
nerabilities in Web Applications. 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’15).
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tests.
The PerfChecker tool [124] statically analyzes Android applications to
identify common performance bugs. Unlike Clarity, PerfChecker detects
performance bugs related to GUI lagging, energy leaks, and memory bloat.
The X-ray tool [10] helps users diagnose performance problems related
to configuration settings. X-ray uses a technique called performance sum-
marization, which couples performance costs with dynamic information flow
analysis. Unlike Clarity, X-ray performs dynamic analysis and focuses on
performance problems caused by user rather than developer error.
Trace analysis is a technique for identifying root causes of performance
anomalies [192, 65]. For example, the TraceAnalyzer tool [65] constructs per-
formance traces that capture the time-varying performance of program runs.
Another approach [192] performs impact and causality analysis on traces to
discover patterns that are correlated with performance problems. These tech-
niques can shed light on a wide variety of performance anomalies, but they
are not fully automated.
Classification and Impact of Performance Bugs. Jin et al. present a
comprehensive study of performance bugs and propose a variety of rules to de-
tect and repair likely performance bugs [104]. These rules, which are inspired
from existing patches, perform pattern-matching over syntactic program con-
structs and require domain-specific knowledge about the classes of performance
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bugs that exist in a given application. A pattern-matching technique is also
proposed in the context of databases [40].
Song and Lu use five open-source applications to study the use of sta-
tistical debugging for finding performance bugs [161]. They find that two
kinds of statistical models involving branch predicates can help pinpoint root
causes of performance problems. The idea is to use existing bug reports to
gather similar efficient and inefficient computations and compute statistically
significant predicates. While quite general, this approach relies on existing
bug reports and on user-provided test parameters.
Zaman et al. find that, for Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome, devel-
opers typically spend more time fixing performance bugs than functionality
bugs [195].
Loop-Invariant Code Motion. The removal of redundant traversal bugs
bears some similarity to loop invariant code motion (LICM), but the prob-
lems are quite different. LICM is typically applied to individual assignment
statements, and it uses a low-level notion of loop-invariance that is based on
reaching definitions. Thus, LICM is not capable of identifying redundant data
structure traversals that are detected by our analysis. Of course, LICM also
performs the actual optimization, rather than simply detecting the inefficiency.
Techniques for Estimating Computational Complexity. Recent work
uses sophisticated static analyses to automatically estimate worst-case resource
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usage—such as running time—of programs [84, 83, 112, 95], and the Trend-
Profiler tool uses profiling and dynamic analysis to estimate empirical compu-
tational complexity [75]. While these approaches can help programmers debug
and understand performance problems, they do not automatically pinpoint
them.
Necessary and Sufficient Preconditions. To detect redundant traversal
bugs, our algorithm constructs dual over- and under-approximations of the
program. Other static analyses that involve negation (or set complement) also
make simultaneous use of necessary and sufficient conditions. In particular,
the interplay between over- and under-approximations has been explored in
path-sensitive static analysis [60], in precise reasoning for unbounded data
structures [61, 62], in the construction of method summaries [52], for analysis
of confidentiality properties [33], and in typestate analysis [68].
May and Must Alias Analysis. May alias analysis [121, 55, 165, 179, 163]
underlies almost any compiler optimization, bug detection, and verification
technique. While not quite as common as may-alias analysis, must-alias anal-
ysis is also considered in several papers [9, 102, 135]. Our work simply utilizes
may- and must-alias information and does not make contributions in this area.
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8.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks
Defending Against Network-Based DoS Attacks Most mechanisms for
defending against DoS attacks are deployed at the network level to monitor
network behavior, identify anomalous traffic, and set up firewalls that block
the attack [72, 3, 169, 140, 131, 176, 114, 46, 108, 190, 175, 155]. Although
these techniques are capable of preventing some DoS (and DDoS) attacks, they
are limited to a specific underlying model of anomalous traffic and can suf-
fer from scalability problems. Furthermore, they sometimes raise false alarms
that prevent legitimate users from accessing the application. In general, dis-
tinguishing between DoS attacks and sudden high-volume user traffic (flash
crowds) is an open problem [91]. A more detailed survey of network-layer DoS
prevention mechanisms can be found elsewhere [130, 4].
More importantly, network-based defense measures are only activated
while the attack is in progress, and they are incapable of diagnosing application-
specific performance issues that can be exploited by low-bandwidth attacks,
including the second-order DoS attacks considered in this thesis.
Defending Against Application-Level DoS Attacks Typical application-
level DoS vulnerabilities cause the software to crash or become unresponsive.
Particularly dangerous are the cases where a small amount of data sent by
an attacker can cause the application to shut down (ping of death [29, 98]),
enter an infinite loop, or trigger a super-linear recursion call-stack (inputs of
coma [35, 162]).
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Dynamic analyses for the detection of application-level DoS vulnerabil-
ities try to generate inputs that either exhibit worst-case execution times or
enter non-terminating loops [26, 25, 86]. Dynamic analyses can be difficult to
scale to large programs and cannot always generate inputs that uncover such
worst-case behaviors.
Static analyses have been used to identify high-complexity code whose
behavior is dependent on user input and can thus be manipulated by an at-
tacker [35, 162]. Such analyses have been able to uncover some simple classes
of algorithmic complexity attacks, but they cannot automatically identify more
subtle cases of algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities, such as improperly im-
plemented hash functions [53]. In particular, detection of such vulnerabilities
requires knowledge about input distributions, which is hard to reason about
statically.
Recent work on static analysis has focused on extreme cases of DoS
vulnerabilities: detection of super-linear recursion call-stacks [35] and infinite
loops [162]. Our work detects DoS vulnerabilities that stem from polynomial
loops that can be manipulated by the attacker, instead of the extreme cases of
superlinear recursion and infinite loops. More importantly, our work focuses
on high resource usage behavior that is triggered by certain kinds of database
queries and where the query result is controlled by the attacker.
Other Static Analysis-Based Defenses Second-order vulnerabilities in-
volving SQL injections (SQLI) and cross-site scripting (XSS) have been known
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for some time, but a static analysis for detecting these attacks has only re-
cently been proposed [54]. Our work is inspired in part by this recent work
and shares a similar overall framework that consists of two connected taint
analyses. However, since we target DoS vulnerabilities rather than XSS and
SQLI, our notions of taint and sanitization are different; thus, the details of the
detection algorithms also differ substantially. First, our analysis must detect
multiple potential insertions into database tables and analyze their perfor-
mance impact. Second, our analysis needs to differentiate between full and
conditional sanitizers, whereas conditional sanitization is not relevant in the
context of XSS and SQLI vulnerabilities. Third, unlike the method of Dahse
and Holz, our technique must perform automated inference to identify con-
ditional sanitizers. Finally, another contribution of this thesis over previous
work is a novel symbolic execution algorithm for generating candidate attack
vectors.
Xie and Aiken [182] implement a symbolic execution algorithm for SQL
injections. The idea is to detect unsanitized variables that reach SQL queries
using semantic analysis of path constraints. Their symbolic execution engine is
similar to ours, but we must solve the additional problem of relating insertions
to extractions. In addition, our engine also generates the attack vectors.
Livshits and Lam describe a flow-analysis for detecting XSS and SQL
injection vulnerabilities in Java [125]. Wassermann and Su use static analysis
to identify XSS vulnerabilities on code using weak sanitization [177]. These
approaches tackle a different security vulnerability and do not reason about
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database interactions.
Automatic Generation of Attack Vectors Kiezun et al. [110] describe
a method of generating attack vectors for XSS attacks and SQL injections.
Specifically, they use dynamic symbolic execution to generate concrete inputs
that trigger execution paths involving sensitive nodes. Sen et al. [156] and
Chaudhuri & Foster [38] use similar dynamic symbolic execution methods for
Javascript and Ruby-on-Rails respectively. Since our approach is static, it
has the potential to report more false positives, but a key advantage is that it
does not depend on an input-generation mechanism or a mutation library.
8.3 Side-Channel Attacks
Side channels in web applications. While side-channel leaks have been
known for decades, the first thorough study of side-channel leaks in web ap-
plications is presented by Chen et al [39]. Specifically, they study common
types of side channels in modern web applications and demonstrate that side
channels are a serious and realistic source of privacy problems. They also
argue that effective mitigation strategies are application-specific and require
detecting underlying vulnerabilities in the application.
The only previous tool for automatically detecting side-channel vulner-
abilities in web applications is Sidebuster [197], which consists of a combined
static and dynamic analysis. In particular, Sidebuster first uses static taint
analysis to determine whether network traffic may depend on sensitive data.
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If so, Sidebuster proceeds to perform a dynamic analysis on related network
operations to quantify the information leak. Our approach differs from Side-
buster in several ways: First, in addition to identifying which operations are
tainted by sensitive data, our approach also statically determines asymptotic
differences in resource usage. Second, our static detection framework is more
general and can be instantiated for any kind of resource. For example, the
timing and response-size side-channel vulnerabilities detected by Scanner
fall outside the scope of Sidebuster. Finally, the vulnerabilities discovered by
Sidebuster can only be exploited by an attacker who is able to sniff network
traffic, which requires the attacker to be in the same network path as the vic-
tim. In contrast, our approach detects vulnerabilities that can be exploited
remotely through cross-site search attacks.
Web timing attacks. Felten and Schneider present one of the first case
studies on web timing attacks [67]. In this work, they infer the browsing
history of other users by measuring the loading times of external websites.
In later work, Brumley and Boneh show how to extract private keys from
web servers running OpenSSL using timing attacks [24]. Bortz and Boneh
introduce cross-site timing attacks, and describe web timing attacks in which
they obtain valid usernames as well as items in users’ shopping carts [22].
Gelernter and Herzberg introduce cross-site search attacks as a mecha-
nism for exploiting side-channel vulnerabilities [71]. Van Goethem et al. show
that multimedia tags in HTML5 can be exploited to estimate response sizes
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during web timing attacks [172]. Our work uses these two known attack tech-
niques to assess the severity of the vulnerabilities uncovered by our approach.
However, we emphasize that our work aims to detect application-specific vul-
nerabilities rather than to describe a new class of web timing attacks.
Non-interference. One possible security policy for preventing side-channel
leaks is non-interference, which was originally described by Goguen and Meseguer [74].
As mentioned in Chapter 6, non-inference is a very strict security policy which
requires that secret data should never affect the values of publicly observable
variables.
In the formal methods and programming languages communities, there
has been significant research effort on verifying non-interference. The simplest
method for proving non-interference is self-composition, which sequentially
composes two alpha-renamed copies of the same program and encodes the
non-interference property as an assertion, which can then be checked by an
off-the-shelf verifier [18]. Since self-composition does not work well in practice,
subsequent papers try to improve analysis precision by using more sophisti-
cated techniques (e.g., involving product programs) [17, 170]. As explained in
Section 6.3, we could, in principle, use similar techniques to detect resource
side-channel vulnerabilities by first instrumenting the program with ghost vari-
ables to track resource usage. However, the resulting approach would yield
too many false positives, since small differences in resource usage are unlikely
to be observable. In contrast, our approach focuses on asymptotic resource
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side-channel vulnerabilities and detects them using lightweight static analysis
rather than heavy-weight verification techniques that require the inference of
precise loop invariants.
There have also been other proposals for statically checking security
policies like non-interference. For instance, Jif [134] is a security-typed ex-
tension of Java that checks information flow and access control. Other tech-
niques [13, 41, 126] use static analysis to quantify leakage in terms of Shannon’s
information theory. However, none of these techniques addresses side channels
that arise due to asymptotic imbalances in resource usage.
Mitigation of side-channel leaks. To mitigate side-channel leaks , mech-
anisms such as introducing random delays or fixing server response times have
been proposed. Kocher shows how adding random delays can be overcome
by an attacker by collecting more timing measurements [113]. Bortz and
Boneh describe how making inter-chunk transmission times constant can de-
fend against their timing attacks [22], but cross-site search attacks allow an
attacker to inflate computation times, minimizing the effects of this defense.
Disallowing cross-site requests is impractical, given their widespread use in the
modern web. Anti-CSRF defenses such as requiring the submission of secret
tokens or checking the origin header of the request [16] are typically suffi-
cient to prevent unintended state-changing requests, but they have not been
widely deployed against cross-site attacks [71]. However, even in the presence
of these defenses, the underlying side-channel vulnerabilities can leak private
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information in the presence of man-in-the-middle attacks.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have presented formal definitions for performance-
related bugs and security vulnerabilities, and static analyses for detecting
them. We have used our tools to uncover 92 performance bugs, 37 denial-of-
service vulnerabilities, and 10 side-channel vulnerabilities, in mature, widely
used, open source applications with over hundreds of thousands of lines of
code.
Our definitions capture the subtle symptoms of problematic perfor-
mance, beyond the traditional notion of slow running times. Our static anal-
yses compute lightweight approximations of a program’s asymptotic complex-
ity, by leveraging traditional techniques from static analysis such as weakest-
precondition computation and taint analysis.
Our work opens a new avenue of research in software quality: prob-
lematic performance can have different symptoms beyond slow program ex-
ecution, and as these subtle manifestations of bad performance continue to
escape existing techniques and become widespread in software, there will be
a growing need to implement rigorous analysis techniques to achieve effective
performance understanding.
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Appendix A
Web Applications in PHP
In this appendix, we provide relevant background on PHP and rela-
tional databases.
A.0.1 Background on PHP Scripts
PHP is one of the most popular programming languages for web de-
velopment, with approximately 82% of server-side scripts implemented using
PHP [160]. Specifically, PHP makes it convenient to create dynamic web pages
that interact with the user and customize page content based on user prefer-
ences. There are two key reasons why PHP is so popular for web application
development: (1) HTML integration, and (2) native support for relational
databases.
HTML integration. One of the most useful features of PHP is the way it
allows programmers to handle HTML forms. Specifically, when a user fills out
an HTML form, it is possible to invoke a PHP script with the user data stored
in so-called superglobals that are available in every scope. Two of the most
commonly used PHP superglobals are $ GET and $ POST, both of which are
mappings from keys to values (called arrays in PHP terminology). If a web
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form contains an input field named x which is sent using the HTTP POST
(resp. GET) method, then $ POST["x"] (resp. $ GET["x"]) holds the
value of the user input for field x. For instance, consider the following HTML
form:
<form action="example.php" method="get">
Name: <input type="text" name="name">
<input type="submit"> </form>
and the corresponding PHP script called “example.php”:
echo $_GET["name"];
Here, when the user enters their name into the name field of the
above HTML form and clicks submit, a PHP script called “example.php”
gets executed. Furthermore, since the web form specifies the data submission
method to be HTTP GET, the user input is stored in the superglobal variable
$ GET["name"]. Thus, the net effect of the above script is to simply print
out the name entered into the web form.
Database support. Another attractive feature of PHP is its native support
for databases. The most popular database system used with PHP is MySQL,
which is an open-source, cross-platform relational database. Certain built-in
PHP commands allow scripts to connect to a MySQL database and request
content that is typically displayed on a webpage. For the purposes of this
paper, the most relevant command is the mysqli query function, which
takes as input a string corresponding to the database query. For instance,
consider the following PHP code:
$name = $_GET["name"];
$query = "SELECT * FROM Customers WHERE Name=$name";
$result = $mysqli->query($query);
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This code selects from the Customers database exactly those people whose
name matches the user input. Insertions into the database are performed in a
similar way, also using the mysqli query function.
A.0.2 Relational Databases
In relational databases, such as MySQL, data is organized into tables
(or relations) of rows and columns where there is a unique key associated with
each row. In this model, each row is a tuple representing a single data item,
and each column is a labeled attribute of the tuple. Given a relation R with set
of attributes A and a formula ϕ such that vars(ϕ) ⊆ A, a selection operation
σϕ(R) selects all tuples in R that satisfy condition ϕ. Similarly, given a set A
′
and a relation R with attributes A such that A′ ⊆ A, a projection operation
piA′(R) yields a new relation R
′ that includes all rows of R but only those
columns whose name is in A′. Hence, the following MySQL query:
SELECT Author FROM Papers
WHERE title = "X" AND author="Y"
corresponds to the operation piauthor(σϕ(papers)) where ϕ represents the for-
mula title = “X” ∧ author = “Y ”.
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to any set of tuples retrieved
from relation R as a view of R. Hence, the result of any MySQL query of the
form:
SELECT ... FROM MyTable WHERE ...
corresponds to a view of MyTable. Note that every relation R is also a view
of itself. Given some view R, we write |R| to denote the number of tuples in
R.
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